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ABSTRACT 
Informal funds transfer systems (IFTS) are prevalent throughout the world and are 
used for various legitimate and illegitimate purposes.  There are many variations of these 
systems that can be generally classified as traditional or modern systems.  Traditional and 
modern IFTS share many of the same characteristics, but that is the extent of the 
similarities between these two groups.  Traditional systems were developed to meet the 
legitimate needs of businesses and individuals and at times became the formal banking 
system within the Middle East and South Asia.  Conversely, modern IFTS were 
developed purely as criminal systems and have no legitimate purpose.  Whereas 
traditional systems have predominantly positive effects on the communities in which they 
operate, modern systems are the exact opposite and have predominantly negative effects. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the use of traditional and modern IFTS in order to 
identify the specific macro indicators and conditions responsible for their development 
and continued use.  Identifying these indicators will allow regional, national and 
international agencies and organizations to detect the emergence or presence of IFTS and 
focus their efforts to develop effective regulatory policies to limit the illegitimate use 
while maintaining the legitimate aspects of these systems. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the development of informal funds 
transfer systems (IFTS).  These systems are prevalent throughout the world and are used 
for various legitimate and illegitimate purposes.  There are many variations of these 
systems that can be generally classified as traditional or modern systems.  Traditional 
systems are based on two primary systems, hawala and fei-chien.  Modern systems are 
primarily based on the Black Market Pesos Exchange (BMPE).  The major research 
question is: Are there specific macro indicators or conditions that can be used to identify 
the emergence or use of informal funds transfer systems in a particular region? 
The hypothesis underlying this thesis project is that the specific macro conditions 
that lead to the development or continued use of IFTS can be identified.  IFTS are a 
special class within the financial sector and have specific characteristics that can be 
recognized.  By identifying and analyzing current systems, the conditions that lead to 
their development can be determined. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
IFTS have gained notoriety and have been the subject of much scrutiny since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Although illegal or unregulated in many countries, prior 
to September 11 minimal academic research was conducted on these systems and many 
Western governments paid little attention to them.  The knee-jerk reaction after 
September 11 has swung the pendulum far in the opposite direction and is focusing 
efforts to regulate IFTS in unrealistic or impractical areas.  For example, The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) approach to IFTS has predominantly been to transpose current 
international anti-money laundering standards for the formal banking sector onto the 
informal sector.  Furthermore, current U.S. policy requires registration at the federal level 
and licensing at the state level.  There are many inconsistencies with these requirements 
and above all, they do not account for the scale and customer base of IFTS operations. 
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There are two basic categories of IFTS use, legitimate and illegitimate.  While 
traditional systems have been in existence for centuries and are primarily used in 
legitimate transactions such as worker remittances, modern systems have been developed 
for primarily illegitimate purposes including money laundering and tax evasion.  It is 
important to note that even the legitimate use of IFTS can have negative effects.  The vast 
quantity of funds moving through legitimate transactions can be detrimental to the 
economies of developing countries by circumventing the formal financial sector thereby 
avoiding taxes and weakening the currency. 
The importance of this research derives from the need to understand the necessity 
for IFTS and the characteristics that make them desirable for both legitimate and 
illegitimate uses.  A firm understanding of this will allow the specific conditions that lead 
to the development of IFTS to be studied and analyzed.  Knowing the specific conditions 
will then allow for effective regulatory policies to be implemented in order to limit 
illegitimate use and decrease the economic harm that legitimate use can cause.  There is a 
definite need for traditional IFTS, especially in the developing world were the formal 
banking system has limited or no capability to address the financial needs of the people.  
Consequently, the primary desire should not be to close all IFTS operations, but to design 
policies that will allow effective regulation while at the same time keep the beneficial 
aspects for legitimate use.  Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to establish the first step in 
this process upon which further research will be able to build towards the ultimate 
objective of comprehensive and beneficial IFTS regulation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relatively recent widespread attention given to informal funds transfer 
systems has created a diverse set of literature on the subject.  The fact that this attention 
was brought about by the terrorist attacks on September 11 only adds to the wide 
spectrum of views and opinions.  In light of this, the current body of knowledge does not 
necessarily allow for categorizing specific schools of thought; the exception being in 
regard to the amount of illegitimate use.  Instead, much of the research focuses on the 
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different aspects of the traditional and modern systems.  The following review highlights 
each of those areas that will be applicable to this thesis. 
1. IFTS Characteristics 
Millions of immigrant workers transfer funds through IFTS on a monthly basis to 
their home countries.  While each of these individual transfers are likely to be relatively 
small, $200-600 per month for immigrants from Central and South America, the total 
amounts transferred around the world each year are quite significant.1  IFTS have 
historically provided fast, secure and low-cost community based options for workers to 
send money to their home countries.  These systems have become essential for many 
individuals who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to use to the formal banking 
systems.2  In addition, the formal banking systems have failed to recognize the needs of 
this group and supply appropriate services for them.  The extremely large number of 
small transactions generated is simply not compatible with the current banking structures 
in many parts of the world.3  For countries with banking systems that do have the 
capacity to handle these transactions, they cannot compete with the cost and other 
benefits of IFTS.  Seven primary features have been identified that make them attractive 
for use: speed, convenience, versatility, reliability, anonymity, cost and cultural 
considerations.4 
 
1 John Page and Sonia Plaza, "Migration Remittances and Development: A Review of Global 
Evidence," Journal of African Economies S2 (2006): 276. 
2 Leonides Buencamino and Sergei Gorbunov, Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Development Finance. United Nations, Discussion Paper of the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs No. 26, November 2002; Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering, 
"Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism," The British Journal of Criminology 45 (2005): 479; Shahid 
Nawaz, Roddy McKinnon and Robert Webb, "Informal and Formal Money Transfer Networks: Financial 
Service Or Financial Crime?" Journal of Money Laundering Control 4 (2002): 331-332; Nikos Passas, 
Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; a study into so-called underground banking 
networks, U.S. State Department, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/img/assets/4756/ivts.pdf (accessed 28 
February 2008). 
3 Buencamino and Gorbunov. 
4 Mohammed El-Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer 
Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, (Washington D.C.: IMF, 2003), 7-9; Nikos Passas, 
"Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics1," Journal of Scandinavian 
Studies in Criminology & Crime Prevention 7 (2006): 57; Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, “The 
hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money  laundering,” Interpol, 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp (accessed 18 January 
2008); Smriti S. Nakhasi, "Western Unionizing the Hawala?: The Privatization of Hawalas and Lender 
Liability," Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 2 (2007): 483-488.  
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2. Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses 
When discussing the legitimate and illegitimate uses of IFTS, there is an 
important distinction that must be made regarding which system, traditional or modern, is 
being used and why the system is being used.  Traditional systems are predominantly 
used for legitimate purposes, although they can also be used for illegitimate purposes.5  
Modern systems, on the other hand, are used for purely illegitimate purposes. 
Traditional IFTS have operated for centuries as legitimate and legal systems 
originally developed to enhance efficiency and security for financial transactions.  
Although IFTS are currently illegal in many countries, the criminalization of their use has 
occurred relatively recently from a historical perspective.  As formal banking systems 
developed and became regulated, traditional IFTS remained on the outside as a parallel 
system operating in an unregulated and undocumented environment.  It is the fact that 
these systems are unregulated and therefore do not pay taxes and do not comply with the 
formal banking practices and reporting requirements that has made them illegal.  Even 
now as illegal systems, their services are still required for many otherwise legitimate 
situations.  Legitimate use of IFTS includes migrant workers remittances, humanitarian 
and emergency aid, business necessity, intelligence use, and personal use. 
This legitimate use is contrasted by the illegitimate use of traditional and modern 
systems by criminals and terrorist organizations who are attempting to hide either the 
original source or the eventual purpose of the funds.6  The primary criminal concern 
regarding the illegitimate use of IFTS is the source and purpose of the funds being 
transferred.  While the actual transactions of these funds are also important in that they 
contribute to the large unaccounted currency flows, the criminal or terrorist acts used to 
acquire the funds and the future operations for which the funds are intended are a higher 
 
5 Motoo Noguchi, "Help Needed for the 'Unbanked'," The Washington Post Mar 26, 2004, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=589630931&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 12 March 2008). 
6 Roger Ballard, "Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal 
Value Transmission Systems: The Operational Dynamics of Contemporary Hawala Networks," Journal of 
Banking Regulation 4 (2005): 344.  
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priority for law enforcement agencies.7  Illegitimate use of IFTS includes money 
laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, smuggling, arms and drug trading, and 
corruption. 
Although most use of IFTS is technically illegal, the distinction in criminal nature 
and intent is important.  In the case of legitimate use, the primary criminal aspect is the 
transaction itself and the fiscal implications since countries cannot track the amount of 
currency within their economy that is generated by these informal transactions.  This 
amount can be significant, estimated at $1-3 billion in some nations, and therefore can 
have a large impact on national economic decisions and policies.8  While there is an 
obvious need to regulate and account for these transactions, the funds used for these 
legitimate purposes are usually from a legal source and are intended to be used for a legal 
purpose by the recipient.9 
3. Criminal vs. Necessary  
Two issues have emerged in relation to the overall use and impact of IFTS: 
quantity of illegitimate use and macroeconomic impact.  First, the predominant debate 
that has occurred in this field follows from the above section on legitimate and 
illegitimate uses.  With the various uses in mind, the debate has centered on the quantity 
of traditional IFTS use for each of these.  While there is consensus that the majority of 
IFTS use is for legitimate purposes, two schools of thought have developed regarding the 
amount of illegitimate use.  This debate focuses only on the illegitimate use of traditional 
IFTS, since there is complete consensus on the criminal nature of modern systems. 
Prior to September 11, the small amount of reporting on IFTS often focused on 
the illegitimate aspects and criminal uses of IFTS.  Following the attacks, this view was 
reinforced and well publicized in the media and academic literature, often referring to 
 
7 Ballard, “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal Value 
Transmission Systems,” 344. 
8 Anand Ajay Shah, “The international regulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems,” Utrecht Law 
Review, 2 (2007): 208; El Qorchi, et al., 35-40. 
9 Maryam Razavy, "Hawala: An Underground Haven for Terrorists Or Social Phenomenon?" Crime, 
Law and Social Change 3 (2005): 287-288. 
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them as terrorist banking systems.10  The most frequently cited criminal activity for IFTS 
is money laundering.  The vast majority of literature in this school cites IFTS as a key 
factor in many money-laundering operations.11  The characteristics of IFTS, especially 
anonymity and speed, are the basis for the view of these systems providing a high level of 
support for criminal and terrorist networks.  The beneficial aspects for legitimate users 
also make these systems ripe for exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations.12 
The second school of thought recognizes the potential for criminal and terrorist 
use of IFTS, but does not see it as a large-scale problem.  Instead, IFTS are viewed as 
necessary systems that play a vital role in the economies of many developing countries.  
These systems provide financial services to many who have no access to the formal 
banking system.13  This school contents that many of the claims of IFTS financing 
terrorism are baseless and rely on faulty conventional wisdom.  One claim in particular is 
that the September 11 hijackers were financed through IFTS.  Although this has been 
disproved, it was well publicized and perpetuates the myth of IFTS being terrorist 
systems.  No proof exists that IFTS are favored over the formal system by criminal or 
 
10 Jonathan Winer, Prepared speech for the Senate Banking Committee Hearing on the 
Administration’s “National Money Laundering Strategy for 2001,” September 26, 2001, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/092601_winer.html (accessed 11 April 2008); International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1999, 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/ml_intro99.html (accessed 7 March 
2008); Lisa C. Carroll, “Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money 
laundering in INTERPOL member countries on the Asian continent,” Interpol, 
http://www.interpol.com/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney/default.asp (accessed 28 
February 2008); Jost and Sandhu; 
11 Walter Perkel, “Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems,” The 
American Criminal Law Review 41 (2004): 190-191; Bala Shanmugam, “Hawala and Money Laundering: 
A Malaysian Perspective,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 8 (2004): 37-38; Larry B. Lambert, 
“Underground Banking and National Security,” SAPRA INDIA Bulletin Article, 
http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96feb-mar/si960308.html (accessed 7 March 2008); Ronald M. 
Rose, “Another deal, another dollar,” Security Management 6 (2003) 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=352493611&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 12 March 2008); Douglas Farah, “U.S. Targets Firms Laundering Money; Colombian Cartels 
Said to use Top Companies,” The Washington Post, Jun 21, 1999; Razavy, 288; International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report 1999; Carroll; Jost and Sandhu. 
12 Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering, A Report to the 
National Institute of Justice, November 2003, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf 
(accessed 12 March 2008); Shah, 202; Perkel, 184; Nawaz, et al., 330. 
 7
                                                                                                                                                
terrorist organizations.  In fact, it has been suggested that the formal system may actually 
be a better vehicle for criminals to use.14   
The second issue concerns the macroeconomic impact of IFTS.  There is broad 
consensus from both schools on this issue.  Regardless of the legitimate or illegitimate 
use of IFTS, the vast quantities of currency moving through these systems can have a 
significant economic impact on a developing country.  There has been no reliable data to 
accurately estimate the amount that flows through IFTS, but current studies put the 
amount around $100 billion worldwide and $1 to $10 billion in individual countries.15  
Since there is no formal record of these transactions, they are not reflected in a nation’s 
official statistics for assets and liabilities.  In addition, IFTS tend to weaken a nation’s 
currency through the use of black market exchange rates by the operators.  Lastly, IFTS 
hurt national economies by avoiding direct and indirect taxes on their transactions.16 
4. Origins of IFTS 
The origination of IFTS will be addressed in two parts; first looking at traditional 
IFTS, hawala and fei-chien, and second reviewing the modern system of the Black 
Market Peso Exchange.  Contrary to many reports, traditional IFTS were not developed 
to “circumvent currency controls” nor were they “born out of political turmoil and 
distrust of banks.”  Hawala and fei-chien were developed centuries ago for legitimate and 
practical purposes when formal banking systems did not exist.17  The development of 
hawala occurred during the medieval period in South Asia and the Middle East, and is 
 
13 Roger Ballard, “Hawala: criminal haven or vital financial network?” 
http://www.arts.manchester.ac.uk/casas/papers/pdfpapers/iiashawala.pdf (accessed 12 June 2008); 
Noguchi; El-Qorchi, et al., 12.  
14 Nikos Passas, “Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them?” Risk 
Management 5 (2003): 50; McCulloch and Pickering, 480; Noguchi; Passas, “Demystifying Hawala,” 60; 
Buencamino and Gorbunov. 
15 Buencamino and Gorbunov; Page and Plaza, 266. 
16 Mohammed El-Qorchi, “Hawala: Based on Trust, Subject to Abuse,” Economic Perspectives 
September 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/qorchi.htm (accessed 18 January 2008); 
Matt Miller, "Underground Banking," Institutional Investor-International Edition 1 (1999), 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=15129
75&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed 7 March 2008). 
17 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
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first seen as a legal concept in 1327.  During this time, there was little to no formal 
systems capable of handling the increasingly complex business transactions.  Economic 
interaction was limited due to varying tribal laws and a continuing shortage of silver 
coins needed for payment.  Security for transporting funds also became an issue as trade 
routes were expanded.18  An institutional solution began to emerge which was heavily 
influenced by the Koran and shari’a. With the development of Islamic law directing 
financial matters, the unpredictability and complexity of tribal interactions began to 
disappear.19  This eventually evolved into the hawala system and became a “complex and 
geographically limitless network for transferring sums of money” in an efficient and safe 
manner.  The basic pillars of this system have remained unchanged for centuries; close 
networks, kinship, trust, and religious conviction.20 
Fei-chien has its origins in the growing commodity trade between north and south 
China during the T’ang dynasty (618-907 A.D.).  As trade increased, transporting large 
sums of money over long distances became inconvenient and risky.  To resolve this, 
merchants began to pay their proceeds to “memorial offering courts” maintained by the 
provincial governors in the northern Imperial Capital.  These courts would give the 
merchant a certificate to be redeemed by their local provincial government in the south.  
The court would then use the funds from the merchant to pay the taxes owed to the 
central government from the provincial government.21  Similar to hawala, fei-chien 
functions on an “overarching social system of rules that govern all social behavior.”  
Violations of trust in this system will result in the offender being a social outcast and 
“shunned in all circles.”22 
 
18 Matthias Schramm and Markus Taube, “Evolution and institutional foundation of the hawala 
financial system,” International Review of Financial Analysis, 12 (2003): 406; Razavy, 281. 
19 Divya Sharma, "Historical Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural Understanding, and Criminal Abuses of 
Hawala," International Criminal Justice Review 2 (2006): 103-104; Shah, 197. 
20 Schramm and Taube, 407; Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; 
Nawaz, et al., 333. 
21 William L. Cassidy, “Fei-Chien, or Flying Money: A Study of Chinese Underground Banking,” 
http://www.alternatives.com/crime/flyingmo.html (accessed 12 March 2008); Buencamino and Gorbunov; 
Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
22 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
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Fei-chien expanded when Chinese began to migrate within and eventually outside 
their home nation.  This migration, beginning in the seventeenth century, was the basis 
for the development of the “split family.”23  The immigrants would leave their families in 
China, and then establish another family in the province or nation they resided.  This 
arrangement required a system to remit money to support the original family.  Expatriate 
families who owned stores would use the business to facilitate the transfer of funds for all 
the immigrants in their area.24   
Contrary to the above traditional systems, the BMPE is a modern system that was 
developed for criminal use.  The purpose was to aid Colombian importers evade currency 
controls which would reduce their profits.25  Brokers would purchase U.S. dollars at 
official rates and then sale them to the importers for a premium.  Although they were 
paying an above market rate for the currency, the importers could still make a large profit 
because of the taxes and duties they were able to avoid.26 
As this system was developing, the illegal drug trade between the U.S. and 
Colombia was increasing.  The drug traffickers had essentially the opposite problem as 
the importers; they had U.S. dollars from the sale of drugs and wanted pesos, while the 
importers had pesos and needed dollars to pay overseas accounts.  The broker now acts as 
a middleman to conduct an “exchange” between the two parties where the pesos will go 
to the traffickers and the dollars will be used by the importer to buy more goods within 
the U.S.27 
D. METHOD AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis will use the comparative case study method to analyze traditional and 
modern IFTS.  Within this framework, the hawala and fei-chien systems will be used to 
provide the analysis of traditional systems, while the Black Market Peso Exchange will 
 
23 Buencamino and Gorbunov. 
24 Cassidy. 
25 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Rose; Farah; International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999. 
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be used for the modern systems.  Hawala and fei-chien have been in existence for 
centuries, while the BMPE is a newer system dating back only a few decades.   
Although much of the scrutiny of traditional IFTS, commonly lumped together as 
“hawala” in the media, has centered on their use as a terrorist banking system, the hawala 
and fei-chien systems began as legitimate and needed financial systems before the 
existence of the modern banking system.  The effects of globalization have caused these 
systems to spread around the world and although they do appeal to criminal and terrorist 
organizations, the data suggests that the vast majority of transactions are conducted for 
legitimate purposes.  Analysis of these systems will provide the conditions under which 
primarily legitimate future systems may develop. 
Conversely, BMPE was established and is used exclusively as a criminal system.  
Initially developed to bypass currency controls, it now also plays a major role in 
facilitating money laundering for the international drug trade.  Analysis of the BMPE will 
provide insight into the conditions under which illegitimate future systems may develop.  
This thesis will be arranged in five chapters.  Following the introduction, chapter 
two will describe the legitimate and illegitimate use.  This chapter will show why these 
systems are desirable and needed in many parts of the world, and how the global spread 
of IFTS has affected their use.  Chapters III and IV will analyze the traditional and 
modern informal funds transfer systems respectively.  This analysis will focus on the 
origins of the system as well as the economic and social factors influencing their use.  
The conclusion will then provide the macro indicators that can be used to identify the 
emergence or continued use of IFTS.  Finally, policy recommendations will be to assist in 
the development of effective regulation of IFTS. 
 11
                                                
II. LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE USE OF IFTS 
A. LEGITIMATE USE OF IFTS 
Legitimate use of informal funds transfer systems is predominantly associated 
with traditional systems.  While there can be illegitimate use of traditional systems, there 
is no legitimate use of modern systems. 
1. Migrant Remittances 
The advancements in technology and the development of a global economy over 
the past thirty years would lead some to believe that the use of IFTS should decrease as 
banks and financial centers become international entities.  However, the opposite is 
actually the case.  The growth of the global economy, particularly in the U.S., Europe, 
and the oil rich Middle East nations, has caused a significant rise in global immigration as 
migrant workers seek higher wages in the labor markets of the developed world.28  Many 
of these migrant workers come from high poverty rural areas in Asia, North Africa, and 
Latin America.  As these workers migrate throughout the world, most will send 
remittances to their families in their country of origin.  Although the individual 
remittances will be relatively small, averaging $100-300 per month, the combined yearly 
total is very significant, estimated at up to $100 billion.29   
The development of the international formal financial system has not accounted 
for this population and instead is primarily structured to service the needs of corporations 
and governments.  The formal system is not designed or equipped to handle the 
extremely large number of small transactions that occur on a monthly basis.  Even if it 
could physically handle the transactions, the formal system currently cannot complete 
most of the transactions in a cost-effective, secure, and efficient manner.  In addition, 
since much of the international system is designed to service corporations and 
 
28 Ballard, “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal 
Value Transmission Systems,” 324. 
29 Page and Plaza, 256-257, 276. 
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governments, most of the offices are located in big cities and have no or limited ability to 
deliver funds to the rural areas where the recipients live.30 
The rise in world immigration patterns, and the resultant substantial remittance 
flow, combined with the inability of the formal financial system to provide adequate 
service for this population has therefore actually led to a dramatic increase in the use of 
IFTS instead of a decrease.31  The use of traditional IFTS by migrant workers to send 
remittances to their families is not only the largest legitimate use of these informal 
systems, but it also accounts for the vast majority of all IFTS use. 
2. Humanitarian and Emergency Aid 
In many situations, humanitarian and emergency aid workers must rely on 
traditional IFTS in order to accomplish their mission.  In weak or failed states such as 
Afghanistan and Somalia where the formal banking system is either very weak or 
nonexistent, informal systems provide the only reliable, secure means of moving funds 
both into and within the country.32  Without these informal systems, the only option 
would be to manually transport funds to needed locations.  The logistics and security 
issues of manual transport make this an unrealistic alternative.  In addition to nations 
struck by war or long term civil strife, catastrophic natural disasters can lead to a 
legitimate need for IFTS.  In such cases where the government and formal financial 
systems are forced to close or operate at substantially lower levels for a period of time, 
informal systems may be the only way to provide funds to the local population and relief 
organizations.  IFTS can also be used to send humanitarian aid to individual families or 
groups in areas that are not accessible by relief organizations.  One such case was 
revealed in California where the Catholic Church as well as Vietnamese expatriates were 
sending money to families in communist Vietnam.33 
 
30 El-Qorchi, et al., 8-9. 
31 Ballard, “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal 
Value Transmission Systems,” 324. 
32 El-Qorchi, et al., 12. 
33 Lambert. 
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3. Business Necessity 
Traditional IFTS not only have a legitimate role in the economies of nations 
where the formal banking system has collapsed or been temporarily shut down, but also 
for nations with otherwise stable economies that for one reason or another are financially 
stressed.  During these periods, strict government regulations on imports, exports, and 
foreign exchange usually causes an increase in the use of IFTS which can become a 
necessity for businesses during these trouble times.  Informal systems “definitely play an 
important role.  In times of crisis, it acts as some sort of valve, where all the steam can be 
released in an effective manner.”34 
An example of where IFTS, specifically hawala, played an essential role for 
businesses during a financially stressful period was in Pakistan during the late 1990s.  
After Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, it was condemned by much of the 
world and the International Monetary Fund froze $1.3 billion in loans to the nation.35  
Strict government controls on foreign currency exchange and imports led to a sharp rise 
in hawala use, for both remittances and businesses.  It is estimated that migrant worker 
remittances through hawala increased $100 million per month.  “The authorities 
destroyed the confidence in the integrity of the financial structure both at home and 
abroad.”36  On the business side, many small businesses, especially importers, could not 
get credit or make currency exchanges with the commercial banks.  In order to buy 
products, many of these businesses had to resort to hawala use to continue operations.  In 
some instances, when the formal banks could not guarantee the ability to provide credit to 








                                                
4. Intelligence Support 
IFTS have also supported intelligence agencies both for moving funds and 
providing actual intelligence.  During WWII, the British promoted the use of these 
systems and even provided some support to systems in Africa.  The IFTS were used to 
send funds to British agents operating in areas occupied by German and Japanese forces.  
Additionally, British agents would use the IFTS operators as informants to gather 
information on enemy forces.38  Another example is of a CIA agent who was engaged in 
the covert war in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces in the 1980s.  From a base in 
Pakistan, the agent would send “large sums” of cash to the mujahideen commanders in 
western Afghanistan.  Within two days of making the initial transaction in Pakistan, the 
agent would receive radio confirmation that the proper amount of funds had been 
delivered.  “The system goes beyond anything we can imagine.  It is very, very well 
developed.”39  Of course the overall legitimacy of IFTS use for intelligence depends on 
the standpoint of the observer.  Especially in matters of warfare and intelligence, what is 
viewed as legitimate by one side is not always considered as such by the other. 
5. Personal Use 
Many times informal systems are used to transfer funds for “personal 
expenditures such as travel, medical care, or college tuition fees.”40  While the formal 
system may be available to conduct these transactions, it is the characteristics of 
traditional IFTS, especially convenience, which makes them desirable for many personal 
transactions.  Personal use may also be dictated by government policies.  When India and 
Pakistan split in 1947, it became illegal to transport currency between the two countries.  
Therefore, if a person was taking a trip from India to Pakistan for example, they would 
use IFTS to convert their currency.  This was accomplished by selling the Indian 
 
38 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
39 Miller. 
40 El-Qorchi, et al., 12. 
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currency to an operator in India and receiving a note which would be exchanged for 
Pakistani currency when they arrived in Pakistan.41 
When examining the legitimacy of these uses, it is important to remember the 
entering position that most of the use of these systems is technically illegal.  It is the 
distinction between the criminal intent of the legitimate and illegitimate uses that is of 
particular concern.  This point is emphasized because some of the legitimate uses, 
especially business and personal use, can be categorized as illegitimate use based on the 
situation.  In the Pakistan example, some companies really had no choice but to use IFTS 
if they wanted to stay in business and were even assisted by the commercial banks.  
However, many businesses also use traditional and modern IFTS when it is not critical to 
their survival in order to avoid currency controls imposed by the government.42  Usually 
these controls are not conducive to businesses, but they also do not threaten their 
existence.  Therefore, in these situations, use of IFTS by a business is clearly an 
illegitimate use. 
Regarding personal use, the particular circumstances of a transfer need to be 
reviewed to determine legitimacy of the transaction.  Convenience alone does not make 
the transaction legitimate.  As with businesses, individuals may also use IFTS for the sole 
purpose of avoiding currency restrictions which of course then makes the transfer 
illegitimate. 
B. ILLEGITIMATE USE OF IFTS 
Evident from the above discussion, legitimacy of traditional IFTS use is not 
always an easy distinction to make.  Not only is legitimacy dependent upon the 
perspective of the person assessing the case, but the individual circumstances of each 
case and the environment in which the transaction took place will influence the decision.  
Illegitimate use can occur with both traditional and modern IFTS and can be sorted into 
six general categories; money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, smuggling, 
 
41 Miller. 
42 El-Qorchi, et al., 12. 
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arms and drug trading, and corruption.  The speed, autonomy, and security with which 
funds can be moved around the world provide significant potential for abuse.43  Money 
laundering through IFTS is connected to all the criminal categories listed since the 
proceeds from many criminal activities are likely to be laundered partially or wholly 
through IFTS.  However, IFTS can also have a distinct role in the operation of each 
criminal activity, thus each of them will be addressed separately. 
1. Money Laundering 
The primary advantage of using IFTS for money laundering is that funds can be 
autonomously transferred to another location and exchanged into a different currency in 
an apparent legal transaction with little or no records of any of the transactions.  These 
funds can then remain in the new location or be transferred back to the original location 
through other legitimate transactions.44  Money laundering schemes can range from small 
to very large-scale operations.  Individuals or small groups may use IFTS in combination 
with a personally owned small business to launder a portion of their profits to avoid 
taxation or hide illegal activity.  One the other hand, the Black Market Peso Exchange 
system used in Columbia to launder drug money and provide cheap dollars to importers is 
extremely large, estimated to launder $3-6 billion per year.45 
Money laundering is a three-phase process consisting of placement, layering, and 
integration.  Placement involves getting the money into the financial system, which can 
be the most dangerous part of the process when using the formal financial system.  
Besides the paper trail of deposits that is generated by the banks, any large amounts, over 
$10,000 in the U.S., will require a report to be filed by the financial institution.  
Placement of funds through IFTS involves less risk and little if any paper trail for law 
enforcement agencies to track to the originator.  Most IFTS dealers operate legitimate 
businesses and therefore can combine legal and illegal funds when making deposits or 
 
43 Shah, 202. 
44 El-Qorchi, et al., 13. 
45 Rose; International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999. 
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use the illegal funds to pay expenses for the business.46  Also, IFTS dealers do not report 
on large sums of money so there is no concern for having to break the deposit into small 
amounts to avoid the reporting requirements as in the formal system. 
To layer the funds in the formal banking system, funds are transferred through 
multiple accounts and shell companies to obstruct the trail and reduce the possibility that 
the original source of the funds can be traced. This process presents two primary 
problems for the launderer, first the transactions may seen as suspicious and then 
reported, and second a paper trail will be generated, however obscure it might be, that 
could be deciphered.47  With IFTS, the funds will be layered through multiple deposits 
by the IFTS dealer and by separate transfers to other locations.  As the original amount is 
mixed with legal funds then spread across various accounts and countries, very few 
records will remain that could tie the source of the funds to an illegal activity.48 
The last phase of money laundering is integration where the funds are returned to 
the originator in an apparent legitimate form.  Through the formal banking system the 
funds will usually appear as business profit from a shell company or as a loan from an 
offshore bank.49  The advantage of IFTS in the integration phase is that since most of the 
dealers operate or collude with other businesses, especially import and export companies, 
these systems can transform funds into a multitude of different forms, such as material 
goods, commodities, precious stones, or foreign currency.50 
An actual case of money laundering using IFTS and a legitimate business was 
uncovered in Africa where a family network was used to finance a business with drug 
money.  Small amounts of drugs were bought in Amsterdam each month and then sold in 
Paris for a profit.  The proceeds were laundered through IFTS and the business using a 
variety of legal and illegal transactions. The clean funds were then used to finance 
legitimate investments and trade in raw materials in many parts of the world.  This case 
 
46 Carroll. 
47 Jost and Sandhu; Carroll. 
48 Jost and Sandhu. 
49 Carroll. 
50 Jost and Sandhu. 
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demonstrates the ability to mix informal and formal financial systems and use a 
legitimate business to conduct money laundering.51 
2. Terrorist Financing 
The anonymity and unregulated nature of the systems in addition to a lack of clear 
transaction records make traditional and modern IFTS a potential vehicle for terrorist 
organizations.52  The ability of IFTS dealers to conduct multiple transactions and the 
potential to convert the funds into an array of value assets in order to obscure the original 
source and amount of funds is an important feature for terrorist use.  This feature is 
obviously essential when the original funds are from an illegal source, but the basic 
characteristics of IFTS are also attractive when clean funds are to be used for terrorist 
activity.  Legitimately acquired funds could be funneled to terrorists through IFTS to hide 
the legal origin of the funds and provide relatively secure access to the funds for the 
recipient.53  Legitimate funds come from a variety of sources including charities, 
businesses, fund raisers, investments, and donations, and in many cases the original donor 
may not know the funds are destined for terrorist activity.  The use of clean original funds 
is one of the key differences with money laundering and provides a significant challenge 
for law enforcement agencies when attempting to counter terrorist financing.54 
It was initially alleged that the terrorists for the September 11 attacks were 
financed through IFTS.  Upon further investigation though, these early reports were 
proven false and it was shown that the attackers actually received their funds through the 
normal banking system.55  However, the massive attention given to IFTS after September 
11, which highlighted the potential for their use in terrorism, brought the problem to the 
forefront for many nations.  Efforts to counter terrorist financing and reduce the 
anonymous use of IFTS have become a main component of the U.S. counterterrorism 
 
51 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. 
52 Razavy, 288. 
53 El-Qorchi, et al., 13. 
54 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering. 
55 Sharma, 101-102. 
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policy.  Although IFTS may not have been used for the September 11 attacks, the 
potential for their use by terrorist organizations is real.56 
IFTS use to finance terrorism has been documented in some regions.  One of the 
most prevalent areas is South Asia, particularly in India and Pakistan.  Officials in both 
nations acknowledge that the majority, if not all the funding for terrorist operations are 
transferred by IFTS.  Because of the continued and frequent use of informal systems for 
terrorist activity, some organizations have begun to use only “very trusted or especially 
dedicated hawala operators for security reasons.”57  Table 1 shows a few of the 
prominent cases that have been identified in India.   
 
Year Amount Recipient Remarks 
1992 $70,000 Daughter of a senior 
Hurriyat leader 
This was revealed by a Hawala 
operator on his arrest when he went 
to deliver $1,200 to the woman.  
This amount was received from 
Pakistan 
1993 $78,000/year Ikhwan-Ul-Musalmeen 
(IUM) 
Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Deputy 
Chief Commander, disclosed that 
IUM received $78,000 annually 
from ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence 
agency) 
1993 $23,000 All Party Hurriyat 
Conference (APHC) 
Senior leader of Dukhtaran-e-
Millat disclosed that APHC 
received the amount from Pakistani 
agencies 
1993 $72,000 Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JUM) Disclosed by Mohammed Ramzan 
Sofi, alias General Abdullah, Chief 
Commander of JUM 
1997 $217,000 Abdul Majid Dar (AMD) Interrogation of AMD disclosed 
that one senior leader of Hurriyat 
persuaded him to open a cloth shop 





Mohd. Nazir and Shafi Mir Supreme Commander of Hizbul 
Mujahideen sent the amount to 
Kashmir via Dubai and through the 
owner of a carpet company 
Table 1.  
                                                
 Details of Covet/Overt Hawala Transactions Related to Terrorist Activities58 
 
56 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering. 
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One of the expected outcomes of the increased visibility on terrorist financing 
throughout the world and the implementation of more stringent financial controls within 
the formal sector is an increase in the use of IFTS by terrorist organizations.59  While this 
is a logical assertion, there currently is no direct evidence to support this claim.  
Traditional and modern IFTS are undoubtedly attractive for terrorists; however, the small 
amounts of money needed to conduct terrorist attacks can easily be transferred through 
the formal system as well.  As seen with the September 11 attacks, the formal system 
may be just as attractive. 
3. Fraud and Tax Evasion 
As the global economy continues to grow, so does the quantity and value of the 
goods being shipped around the world.  The rise in trade combined with liberal 
regulations increases the potential for abuse of the system by criminal and terrorist 
organizations.  Not only is lawful trade susceptible to abuse through invoice 
manipulation, but illegal goods will also be easier to disguise within the system.60  
Import and export businesses will collaborate and use modern IFTS to avoid customs 
taxes and tariffs and gain higher subsidies from the government based on a perceived 
higher volume of trade.61  Modern systems such as the BMPE, in addition to laundering 
narcotics money, also serve as a vehicle for businesses to avoid taxes and smuggle 
merchandise. 
Individuals are also known to use traditional and modern IFTS to avoid taxes and 
currency controls.  IFTS allow people to move assets to offshore accounts and hide their 
value from the government.  A growing practice in India is for landlords to request rental 
payments to be made by IFTS to overseas accounts.  The funds are then held in a more 
 
59 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering. 
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stable currency and their value is not taxed.62  BMPE also supports individuals who wish 
to evade taxes.  Much like the import businesses, people will buy dollars from a BMPE 
dealer and then hold those dollars in U.S. accounts where they avoid taxes and are hidden 
from the Columbian government.  Columbians have also used the BMPE system to 
convert foreign pension or retirement checks into U.S. dollars without being subjected to 
taxes.63  In areas where there is exchange rate risk due to instability in the country, 
individuals will use IFTS to transfer funds to more secure foreign currencies.64 
4. Smuggling 
IFTS facilitate the smuggling of a variety of value assets including currency, 
precious metals, people, and merchandise.  The smuggling of merchandise is an integral 
part of modern IFTS and will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  The current large-
scale use of traditional IFTS for smuggling is thought to have its basis in gold smuggling 
in South Asia during the 1960s and 1970s.  The growing presence of South Asian migrant 
workers in areas such as the Gulf Cooperation Council states allowed the use of IFTS to 
become a viable option to transfer proceeds from the illegal sale of the gold.65  As a 
result, the smuggling operations became more efficient and at the same time enhanced the 
system for remittance use by the migrant workers.  This also formed the foundation for 
Dubai to become one of the central hubs in the IFTS networks.66 
Smuggling of illegal immigrants into the U.S. and other industrialized countries 
has become a significant problem in the past couple decades.  The growth of the global 
economy has produced a high demand for cheap labor and smuggling networks have 
 
62 Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; "From Donor Kidneys to 
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capitalized on this need.67  IFTS have supported these activities by transferring payments 
from businesses to the smugglers and by moving funds within the smuggling network.  
Hundreds of millions of dollars are generated by these activities and IFTS are also used 
to facilitate the laundering of the proceeds.  In addition, the illegal workers would also 
use IFTS to remit funds to their home countries.68 
5. Arms and Drug Trafficking 
Because of the sensitivity of dealing in arms and drugs and potential complexities 
in their movement, IFTS play an integral part in these transactions.  The anonymity, 
reliability, security, and ability to funnel multiple sources of funds, both legal and illegal, 
provide an efficient structure for criminals and terrorists to use.  The ability of informal 
systems to convert funds or assets into a wide range of other value assets provides the 
basis for many of the trafficking transactions.69  Law enforcement agencies have 
discovered a number of cases where a whole series of transactions have taken place in the 
process of buying or selling arms and drugs.  These include using a mixture of the formal 
and informal financial systems and various business transactions to buy, sell or move 
assets.  This series of transactions allows the original value of the funds or assets to be 
transferred in an almost untraceable fashion and delivered to the recipient in a variety of 
forms.70 
The ability of IFTS dealers to provide for some of the legitimate uses discussed 
above may actually be facilitated by illegal activity.  In areas such as Afghanistan and 
parts of Africa were many NGOs are prevalent and IFTS are the primary means of 
transferring fund, most payments for goods and services are made in cash.  Since physical 
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the IFTS dealer who will distribute the funds to the recipient.  Research suggests that a 
portion of these funds may be supplied to the IFTS dealer from the proceeds of arms and 
drug trafficking.71 
6. Corruption 
The anonymity of these systems and the ability to securely transfer funds to 
offshore accounts makes them a perfect vehicle for bribery and corruption payments.  Not 
surprisingly, many of the high profile cases involving IFTS have occurred in countries 
with weak financial systems or political instability.  The use of informal systems in these 
countries is usually widespread and accepted, even if technically illegal.  Thus, they 
provide a convenient means for criminals to influence politicians or businesses.72  One 
large scale corruption case occurred in India from 1988 to 1991 when many top 
politicians and businessmen, including two former prime ministers, were paid $15 
million through IFTS to manipulate government contracts.73  Corruption is also a by-
product of modern IFTS and can have a detrimental effect on entire regions where these 
systems are prevalent.74 
C. SUMMARY 
The growth of global migration spurred by the rising global economy has allowed 
traditional and modern IFTS to become a significant factor in the economies of many 
countries.  There are several consequences as a result of this rise in IFTS use, some 
beneficial and some not.  Although informal banking systems are largely illegal, they can 
and do provide a legitimate service in many parts of the developing world.  Due to 
instability in much of the developing world along with the formal banking system having 
largely ignored the financial needs of these areas, IFTS is the only option for many 
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people.  In addition to legitimate personal use, IFTS can also have a stabilizing effect in 
some cases during times of financial crisis.  However, the desirable attributes that allow 
IFTS to function in these areas have also been recognized by criminal and terrorist 
organizations and the use of IFTS now has many illegitimate aspects as well.  These uses 
not only facilitate criminal activity, but often deprive a nation of significant revenue 
through violation of customs laws and tax evasion. 
While it is relatively easy to classify a specific use of IFTS as legitimate or 
illegitimate, when the whole system is viewed together, the classification issue is not so 
clear.  In many cases as funds or other value assets are being transferred or stockpiled for 
future use, legitimate and illegitimate funds may be combined and spread throughout the 
networks.  Due to the many layers involved in some IFTS and the fact that settlement 
does not take place immediately, multiple sources of funds are used to complete 
transactions.  Therefore, while the vast majority of IFTS use is legitimate and provides a 
necessary service, it is likely that the large legitimate use itself is what allows the 
illegitimate use to flourish. 
 25
                                                
III. TRADITIONAL IFTS 
A. ORIGIN 
Traditional informal funds transfer systems have evolved over many centuries and 
were initially developed for legitimate and practical purposes when formal banking 
systems did not exist.75  There is actually no clear consensus on when the first use of 
informal systems occurred; some date their first use as far back as 5000BC.  Regardless, 
their use rapidly expanded with the development of long distance trade in the Middle East 
and South Asian areas starting in the early medieval period.76  During this time, there 
were few, if any, formal systems capable of handling the increasingly complex business 
transactions occurring with the expansion of trade routes through these areas.  Two 
specific systems developed during this period to solve these problems, hawala and fei – 
chien.  These systems have continued to evolve and adapt over the past 1500 years and 
are the foundation for most of the traditional IFTS that are seen today, such as hundi 
(India), padala (Philippines), hui kuan (Hong Kong), and phei kwan (Thailand). 
Four specific issues are cited as leading to the formation of hawala and fei-chien; 
lack of consistent legal practices, corrupt civil servants, limited availability of currency, 
and insufficient physical security for long distance trade.  First, economic interaction was 
limited due to the various tribal laws.  There was no consistent agreement on how 
business transactions would be conducted and what recourse was available for fraudulent 
activities.  The inherent uncertainty in conducting business under multiple legal systems 
forced many traders to remain within their own community and thus restricted economic 
growth.   Second, the civil servants who were responsible for establishing regulations and 
interpreting the law were often corrupt.  This only added to the unpredictability and 
arbitrary nature of the economic system which further discouraged economic expansion 
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and aggravated businesses.  Third, business transactions were limited by a shortage of 
currency.  Silver coins were the primary accepted means of payment, but were in short 
supply due to limited silver bullion at the time.  Although an extensive barter system 
could have been used to alleviate this condition, the nature of such a system was not 
conducive to the economic conditions of the time.  Finally, lack of physical security when 
transporting the silver and gold that was exchanged between merchants led to continual 
theft along the trade routes.  As the trade routes expanded and covered greater distances, 
the amount of currency being transported continued to grow and became more lucrative 
for robbers.77  All of these issues were occurring throughout the medieval societies of 
South Asia and the Middle East.  Over a period of time, the rising cost and increased risk 
of conducting business caused institutional reforms and new methods of payment to be 
implemented. 
1. Hawala 
In the Arab communities of the Middle East, these changes became heavily 
influenced by the emergence of Islam.  The teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and the 
tenets of the Quran regarding financial affairs dictated how business would be conducted.    
With the development of Islamic law directing financial matters, the unpredictability and 
complexity of tribal interactions began to disappear.78  As Islam spread the concept of 
hawala was introduced and implemented into many new trading routes.  During the 
Middle Ages, when Arabs replaced Roman dominance, trade rapidly expanded across the 
Indian Ocean to East Africa, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  Since most of the traders were 
Muslim, hawala became the normal method of financing long distance trade across the 
Indian Ocean.79  The term hawala itself “denotes a “draft” or “bill” and is the cession of a 
debt through the transfer of a claim, with the term applying to the payment as well as to 
 
77 Schramm and Taube, 406; Razavy, 281; El-Qorchi, et al., 10-11. 
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Afghanistan,” International Social Science Review 78 (2003): 22-23; Sharma, 103-104; Shah, 197. 
79 Ballard, “Coalitions of reciprocity and the maintenance of financial integrity within informal value 
transmission systems,” 325. 
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the sum paid.”80  The concept began as a simple means of making a payment or 
transferring a claim.  Over time, legal decisions permitted various contractual parameters 
and allowed for payments and debt transfers to occur through multiple parties in different 
locations. The principles of Islam allowed for the use of hawala by Muslims anywhere, 
regardless of physical proximity.   
The core foundation of hawala is trust and this trust came from a shared value 
system.  This foundation was further solidified by the ethnic and linguistic links in the 
Muslim communities.  From these, the hawala system evolved and began to serve the 
financial needs of all the Islamic regions.81    Hawala allowed the state, businesses, and 
individuals to make payments and settle accounts without fear of theft or corruption.  
Eventually it became the “formal” banking system in the Islamic state as it replaced the 
existing official system of collecting and distributing revenue.  Hawala is first recorded as 
a legal concept in Islamic law in 1327, and has continued to evolved into a “complex and 
geographically limitless network for transferring sums of money” in a secure and 
efficient manner.  The basic pillars of this system have remained unchanged for centuries; 
close networks, kinship, trust, and religious conviction.82 
2. Fei-chien 
The growing tea and rice trade in China during the 7th century also necessitated a 
new form of payment to account for the issues with long distance trade.  As commerce 
grew, problems developed for both the merchants and the government.  The merchants 
had to transport large sums of money after selling their goods along the trade routes.  The 
provincial governments were collecting larger amounts in taxes that had to be transported 
to the imperial capital in the north.  To alleviate these problems and the uncertainty and 
insecurity in conducting business over long distances in multiple provinces, the system of 
fei-chien was developed.83  
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Most of the provincial governors maintained “memorial offering courts” in the 
capital city.  When the merchants reached the capital city and sold the remainder of their 
goods, they would deposit the money with the court representing their province.  The 
courts would then use the money to pay the taxes that were due to the central 
government.  When the merchants deposited the money with the court, they would 
receive a certificate which would then be presented to the provincial government upon 
their return to their home province.  The local government would then use the tax money 
which had been collected to pay the merchants the equivalent amount of money that had 
been deposited with the court in the capital city.84 
The concept of fei-chien continued to evolve and formed the basis for many of the 
primitive banks in China.  One particular system was the Shansi banks that emerged in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century.  This evolution was the first use of the fei-chien 
concept to form courier services.85  These systems were organized as family businesses 
and were used to expedite the transportation of money in a secure manner.  The 
merchants that owned these banks would send relatives or business partners to set up new 
offices along the trading routes and in the major cities.  These systems continued the 
tradition of operating as fiscal agents for the government and further increased the 
security and ease of transferring funds.86 
Unlike hawala, fei-chien was not specifically influenced by any particular 
religion.  However, the other factors of close networks, kinship, and trust were integral to 
fei-chien in providing the security and reliability of the system.  The system succeeded 
because it was able to develop an extensive, nationwide network which was operated by 
merchants who were connected through close family and business ties.  Fei-chien was 
also endorsed and extensively used by the local and central government which provided 
validity and stability for the system. 
 




                                                
3. Decline and Re-emergence 
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, IFTS had reached a very high level 
sophistication.  When European traders first came in contact with the Asian trading 
routes, the informal transfer systems were the only option to finance business and 
therefore the European traders had extensive knowledge and experience using these 
systems.  However, as European colonization progressed through the nineteenth century, 
the newly placed colonial regimes instituted the formal European banking practices 
which were familiar to them.  Many of the informal systems for financing trade were 
replaced with the heavily bureaucratic banks.87  In addition, the growing economic 
dominance of the United States and Britain since the 1800s led to their currencies 
becoming the standard by which trade was conducted.  Their power and influence in the 
patterns of global trade also led to European style banks becoming dominant in financing 
the trade.88  
Those in the formal banking systems saw these developments as the demise of 
IFTS.  While they did reduce the use of IFTS and push them to the edges of the trading 
world, by no means did IFTS collapse and cease to exist.  IFTS continued during this 
period to provide the necessary financing for smaller trade routes and for the transfer of 
funds to rural areas not served by the formal banks.  The large resurgence of IFTS began 
after World War II when mass migrations began to flow from former colonies to Europe 
and America.89  From the 1970s onward, high oil prices and globalization have continued 
to fuel the migration of workers from poverty stricken developing nations to the 
developed world.  Labor migration has become a global phenomenon and there are now 
few areas of the world which are not affected in some manner by its existence.90  As 
migrant workers moved around the world, one of the first problems they encountered was 
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how to send money back to their families in a secure manner without losing a high 
percentage to transaction costs.  Remittances have a high economic and social value to 
the workers’ family and play a vital role in the local economies.  These strong economic 
and social reasons led to a large-scale resurgence in the use of IFTS even in light of the 
economic liberalization that has occurred and the large growth in the financial sector.  
B. CHARACTERISTICS 
The evolution of traditional IFTS has given them many advantageous 
characteristics.  These systems have been used in a variety of regions for multiple 
purposes which have allowed them to adapt to many situations.  This ability to adapt to 
new situations and still provide excellent service is a testament to the beneficial features 
of these systems.  There are seven primary characteristics that have evolved and make 
traditional IFTS attractive for use; speed, convenience, versatility, reliability, anonymity, 
cost, and cultural considerations.  Cost and cultural considerations will be discussed in 
the sections on economic and social factors. 
1. Speed 
The first desirable aspect of IFTS is their speed and efficiency.  For transfers 
between major cities, the transaction can be completed in 6-12 hours.  If the money is 
being sent to a rural area or countries with limited communication capability, the 
transaction will usually be complete in 24 hours, but may take up to 48 hours.  
Advancements in telecommunication equipment, such as cell phones, e-mail, and 
facsimile have helped to reduce the transaction time, but this equipment is not required 
for the system to work.91   
On the formal banking side, similar transactions will take up to one week to 
complete.  This is the time required to establish an account and deposit funds, then 
transfer and deliver the funds.92  Increased regulations and restrictions on money 
transfers in some countries can slow the process even further.  The post September 11  
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laws imposed by many countries regarding money laundering have created additional 
layers of bureaucracy that inhibits the formal banking system from competing with the 
speed and efficiency of IFTS.93 
2. Convenience 
Convenience is the second characteristic of IFTS that make them attractive for 
use.  IFTS operators live and work within the community they are serving and are known 
by the local population.  These operators often provide better availability and are willing 
to arrange meetings at a convenient location for the customer.  Transfers can be set up in 
minimal time with no requirement to establish an account or provide detailed 
documentation.94 
In some situations IFTS are the only way to transfer money.  In many developing 
countries or rural areas the formal banking system cannot complete the transaction 
because of limited or no ability to conduct business in those areas.  Even if the bank has 
an office in the destination country, it will likely be located in one of the major cities and 
may not have the ability to courier the money in a secure and timely manner to the 
desired location.95  This makes IFTS desirable not only for individuals sending money to 
family members, but also for companies and non-governmental organizations conducting 
business or operations in remote areas.  Also, since IFTS do not operate within the 
regulations of the formal systems, there are little or no restrictions on amounts of money 
that can be transferred or to what location.  On the other hand, the formal systems usually 
have limits on amounts and frequency of transfers.  For example, Western Union will 
only allow an individual to transfer $1000 once every 30 days from the U.S. to 
Pakistan.96 
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3. Versatility 
Third, IFTS have proven to be very versatile and adaptable to a variety of 
situations.  Despite factors such as economic crises, overly restrictive regulations, internal 
or external conflict, and complexity or lack thereof of the national banking system, IFTS 
have prospered.  These systems have adapted to handle most forms of currency exchange, 
and have been able to operate under many different economic systems regardless of 
regulatory actions.97  An example of the versatility of these systems is seen in 
Afghanistan.  The formal banking system collapsed after years of war and cannot provide 
any commercial services.  The banks that do remain are unable to provide any loans, 
accept deposits, or provide a capability for international or domestic transfers.  
Businesses and organizations working in the country must either physically move money 
around the country or use IFTS to conduct business.  “Given the security concerns, the 
system has appeared to be the only reliable, convenient, and cost-effective mechanism for 
fund transfers.”98 
4. Reliability 
The fourth attractive feature of IFTS is the reliability of these systems.  The 
foundations of IFTS are trust and strong social connections.  For centuries, these systems 
have been able to reliably and securely conduct transfers in all manner of economic 
environments, many of them inadequately regulated.  There is little fear of corruption or 
stealing in these systems and since they operate outside the formal banking systems, they 
are free of the bureaucracy that hinders many of the formal systems.99  The operators of 
IFTS also have a much higher interest in the smooth and reliable operation of their 
business than do banks.  IFTS operators rely on developing personal relationships and a 
good reputation in order to attach more business.  These systems are not covered by 
insurance nor have any of the other financial “protections” offered to banks; therefore 
reliability and security are essential for continued business. 
 
97 El-Qorchi, et al., 9. 
98 Ibid., 9. 
99 Jost and Sandhu; Nakhasi, 485. 
Reliability comes primarily from two aspects of the system, the small number of 
people involved and self-regulation.100  The small number of people involved in the 
transaction prevents the possibility of an information disparity occurring that could be 
capitalized on by one person or group.  Also, the common knowledge of all the details of 
the transaction by each person involved keeps the system honest.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, where client (a) performs a transaction with the local financial intermediary (1) 
to transfer funds to client (b).  A code is given to client (a) who will pass it to client (b) 
along with the details for receipt of the funds.  The code and details will also be passed to 
financial intermediary (2).  When client (b) meets with intermediary (2), the code is 
presented and if it matches, then payment is made.101   
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Figure 1.  
                                                
 Information Flow and Individual Transactions in IFTS102 
The system is also self-regulating in that since it is based on personal 
relationships and trust, information flows rapidly through the network.  Any information 
regarding dishonest behavior will quickly become known and results in a loss of honor 
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and essentially “economic suicide” for the deceitful individual.103  These aspects of IFTS 
promote actions that support a long-term cooperative business mentality and strongly 
discourage any short-term profit motivations that may be considered corrupt or unfair. 
5. Anonymity 
Anonymity is the fifth desirable feature of IFTS.  Much of the research conducted 
on IFTS throughout the world has shown that the operators of these systems do not 
require any identification when conducting business with customers.  This is true both for 
the individual initiating the transfer and for the person receiving the funds.104  As 
mentioned above, the inherent trust in the system and the mechanism of using codes 
negates the need for formal identification and documentation paperwork.  There is also a 
cultural aspect to this mentality that will be discussed later.  The research highlights that 
there is no standard method of record keeping for the transaction itself and in most cases 
the only documentation that is retained after the transfer is complete is that which is 
necessary for settlement purposes between the operators.105  Thus there is no paper trail 
for audits or investigations, nor is there any capability to accurately measure the extent of 
these systems and their impact on the economies of the nations involved.  An example of 
the simplistic bookkeeping used by IFTS operators is shown in Table 1.  Note that there 
is no reference to the client with whom the transaction was made. 
The benefit of anonymity also provides secrecy for migrant workers who may not 
have the proper documentation to function in the formal system.  In addition, many ethnic 
minority groups, especially from the Middle East and South Asia, are sensitive to 
profiling and the additional scrutiny which has occurred since the September 11 attacks 
and therefore turn to IFTS to conduct financial transfers.106  Many of these individuals 
fear that by using the formal banking system, they may attract attention not only to 
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themselves, but their families in other countries.107  This additional attention could lead 
to long processing times, denial of service, or worst case, seizure or freezing of assets. 
 
 
a It is very common to use partial names (e.g. Vinod, Ashish, etc). 
b The chart reflects a tendency to indicate amounts in multiples of 100,000. 
c This column indicates the manner in which payment was made. The "F" reflects the name of a bank and 
the "1202" is the check number. The notation for Ganesh Trading means 52 tolas of gold (tola = 10 gms), 
possibly paid to a local goldsmith or jeweler instead of remitting money through a bank. 
Table 2.  
                                                
 Sample IFTS Bookkeeping108 
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
There are multiple micro and macroeconomic issues involved in the use of 
traditional IFTS and the decisions on whether or not to use them.  The primary 
microeconomic issues are the cost of conducting transactions and the effect remittances 
have on the families living in rural villages.  The primary macroeconomic issues affecting 
the use of IFTS are government policies and regulations, and institutional deficiencies in 
the global formal banking sector.   
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1. Microeconomic Issues 
The lower cost of IFTS transactions is the number one cited reason for their use 
and is also an important factor in decisions on how much to send.  The overall cost of a 
transaction in some cases will be free, however on average a commission will be charged 
that varies between .25% and 5%.109  This cost will vary based on location, both sending 
and receiving, amount being sent, and exchange rate.  For comparison, rates in the United 
States formal banking system range from 5% to 11.75% for sending money to Latin 
America.  In the United Kingdom formal system, rates range from 3% to 37% based on 
amount and destination.110  Although the low end of the formal rates may appear to be 
competitive with IFTS, these rates are only for sending large amounts of money.  The 
average cost for a $200 remittance is 11-13%, and this can significantly increase for those 
transfers going to more remote or rural areas.111 
Data on remittance transactions clearly shows the effect of cost on the type of 
transfer mechanism used.  In many countries, such as Mali, Senegal, and Uganda, where 
costs in the formal sector are high, 70-80% of all remittances are through IFTS.  In 
contrast, in areas such as Latin America, were concerted efforts have been made to 
control transaction costs, only 5-20% of remittances enter through IFTS.  A 1% reduction 
in transaction cost has increased formal remittances by 14-23%.112 
The primary reason IFTS can charge such a low rate, if any at all, is because these 
systems take advantage of differences in exchange rates.  IFTS exploit the difference 
between the official rate and the black market rate.  This difference can be significant and 
provides a major incentive to offer free or very low cost transactions.  The larger numbers 
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of customers that can be drawn in with free transactions will more than make up for the 
loss of small commissions that could have been charged.  The exploitation of exchange 
rates is the primary source of profit for IFTS operators.113 
IFTS operators are also able to keep costs low because of the simplicity of the 
system.  Very little infrastructure or equipment is needed and business can be conducted 
literally anywhere, from a persons home to a table in a restaurant.  An IFTS operator only 
needs a phone and a notebook to conduct business.  Many of these systems are operated 
out of established businesses, so there are very little additional operating costs.  In 
addition, expenses for accounting, licensing, bank accounts, taxes, wire fees, and courier 
fees that formal banks need to consider are not a factor for IFTS.114  These overhead 
costs can account for well over 50% of total expense for a formal money transmitting 
business.  Therefore, since IFTS operators can operate in a substantially more efficient 
manner, they gain a competitive advantage over the formal sector and are able to 
minimize the cost to the customer.115 
The second microeconomic issue with traditional IFTS is the effect they have on 
the families who are receiving the funds.  Officially, remittances are the second largest 
inflow of capital to developing nations, totaling about 50% of the Foreign Direct 
Investment.  However, these numbers only account for formal remittances.  With 
estimates of the informal sector being 50-100% of the formal sector, remittances could 
account for the highest flow of capital in some countries.116   
Some studies in the past have criticized remittances because they are used 
primarily for consumption items and not for investments.  However, these expenditures 
are actually very beneficial to the local communities.  Consumption items include the 
basic necessities, such as food, clothing, health care, and education.  Expenditures on 
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these items are better viewed as investments in social and human capital.117  Increased 
consumption is also directly related to poverty reduction.  Furthermore, money spent on 
consumption items has a strong positive effect on the entire local economy. As the money 
passes through the local businesses, it is spread among the community and has an actual 
economic impact close to double what the initial amount was.  In all, remittances are a 
very important part of the local economies in developing nations.118  They can sustain 
entire families during periods of economic hardship and improve the standard of living in 
many areas where the government either cannot or is unwilling to invest in the 
community. 
2. Macroeconomic Issues 
Government policies and regulations on currency control, tariffs, taxes, and 
financial licensing can have a significant effect on the formation and use of traditional 
IFTS within the country.  Although IFTS are used throughout the world, in both 
developed and developing nations, they tend to flourish in countries that implement 
highly restrictive economic policies or are in political turmoil.  The more restrictive the 
policies are, the wider the use of IFTS.119  Whereas the majority of previous issues and 
factors have primarily affected the individual use of IFTS, changes in government 
policies and regulations also encourage businesses to use IFTS.   
Currency controls affecting foreign exchange rates and the convertibility of a 
currency are the most often cited governmental reasons for individuals and businesses to 
use IFTS.120  When governments try to restrict the flow of capital, or its convertibility, in 
an attempt to stabilize the economy or improve trade deficits, they create a gap between 
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the official and unofficial rate of exchange.  As noted previously, it is this gap in 
exchange rates that IFTS operators capitalize on, and it is one of the most significant 
factors in determining the method of transfer people will use.  This is because an 
overvalued exchange rate essentially acts like a tax on anyone who transfers funds 
through the formal channels.  Therefore the overall cost of the transaction increases, 
which discourages transfers through these channels since cost is an overriding factor.  
This was shown in a study of six African and European countries where a 10% rise in the 
black market premium resulted in a 3% decline in transfers through the formal sector.121 
Pakistan is also a very good case study of the positive and negative effects of 
government policies.  In the 1980s, IFTS were used extensively due to restrictions on 
foreign exchange and the fact that the state owned banks were in miserable condition and 
could not provide adequate services.  Then in the early 1990s, at the insistence of the 
International Monetary Fund, Pakistan began to liberalize its economy and remove the 
currency restrictions.  These actions were successful in bringing in millions of dollars 
through the formal sector and drastically reducing the foreign exchange deficit.  
However, after the nuclear issues with India in 1998, the government once again imposed 
strict exchange controls and reversed previous policies.  Within a year, IFTS had again 
become the dominant method to conduct transfers.122 
Recently, a high emphasis has been put on trying to bring the informal transfers 
into the formal sector.  Given the extraordinary sums of money that are moving through 
the informal sector, it is natural for governments to want to account for this money in 
their formal balance of payments.  To achieve this, the IFTS operators need to become 
licensed, report their transactions, and comply with anti-money laundering (AML) and 
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) laws.  However, coordination at the 
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majority of IFTS transactions are for legitimate purposes, the rush to restrict their use 
after September 11 has not accounted of the unique nature and circumstances in which 
these transactions occur.   
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the recognized inter-governmental 
agency to develop national and international standards for AML and CFT.  FATF’s 
approach to IFTS has predominantly been to transpose current international AML 
standards for the formal banking sector onto the informal sector.  FATF 
recommendations also call for in-depth background investigations for all IFTS operators 
and agents.  At the national level, current U.S. policy requires registration at the federal 
level and licensing at the state level.  All money service business (MSB) principal 
operators, which IFTS fall under, must register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) and enact AML and CFT procedures.123  Furthermore, the states are 
inconsistent with their licensing requirements and do not account for the scale and 
customer base of IFTS.  The monetary requirement to start a MSB varies greatly among 
the states, ranging from $15,000 to $1.5 million.  This is true in other countries as well, 
with regulatory costs ranging from zero in Canada to 2.4 million euro in France.124  
These policies and inconsistencies disenfranchise many ethnic communities and thereby 
encourage the continued use of IFTS.125 
The second macroeconomic issue affecting the further use of IFTS is the 
institutional deficiencies in the global banking system.  Little attention was paid to IFTS 
in the past and only recently has the enormity of their use been recognized.  Therefore, 
the global banking system has not been structured to effectively and efficiently handle 
these transactions in a low cost manner.  Several factors continue to contribute to the 
deficiencies in the formal sector; individuals conducting these transfers are often low net 
worth customers and are not considered to be “prime customers”, small transfers are 
more costly for the banks, and formal banking systems are often not trusted and can be 
 
123 Nikos Passas, “Fighting terror with error: the counter-productive regulation of informal value 
transfers,” Crime, Law and Social Change 45 (2006): 325. 
124 Ratha and Riedberg. 
125 Passas, “Fighting terror with error,” 328; Ratha and Riedberg. 
 41
                                                
intimidating for individuals from developing nations.126  In addition, the more stringent 
Know Your Customer rules that have been enacted since September 11 have also 
increased the difficulty for migrants to use the formal banking system.  In many cases, in 
order to send a bank transfer, both the sender and receiver must have an account with the 
bank.  To open an account proof of identity and proof of residence is required.  Many 
migrant workers cannot provide such documentation.127 
Besides the structural and regulatory issues limiting access to the formal banking 
system, the physical location of the banks is also a significant deterrent.  Transactions are 
often sent to rural areas which are not serviced by the banks.  In most developing nations, 
the banks are primarily located in the urban areas and have limited ability to transport 
funds to remote villages.  This fact highlights a major contradiction with some of the 
regulatory efforts in developed nations to close IFTS.  Although there is plenty of access 
to formal systems in the developed countries, the banks often do not have a direct link to 
a money service provider, much less to a branch of their own in the immediate area of the 
recipient.128  Going back to the fact that many banks require both the sender and receiver 
to have an open account, transfers through the formal system may be impossible because 
of the lack of banks in close proximity to the recipients.  While some banks are beginning 
to offer courier services from the banks in the urban areas to the rural villages, these are 
often slow and unreliable.  The most prominent policies and regulations affecting the 
method of transfer from a particular country are those which “shape the availability and 
access to money transfer services that connect with a service point close to the family 
back home.”129 
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D. SOCIAL FACTORS 
Traditional IFTS have been and continue to be heavily influenced by social 
issues.  Many of the migrant workers originate in areas that place high emphasis on the 
family unit.  In many of these areas, money is not considered to be a personal entity; 
rather it is to be used by the family as a whole based on needs and availability.130  
Cultural tradition and religion are also very important in dictating the actions of 
individuals.  Although many migrant workers move to areas that are technologically and 
financially advanced, where they could take advantage of more modern systems, most 
still use traditional systems.  The long-term existence and success of IFTS is due to its 
“embeddedness in common culture and belief.”131 
1. Culture 
Cultural considerations not only encourage migrants to remit money through 
IFTS, they are also vital to the functioning of the system.  Personal relations, ethnic ties, 
and kinship are the basis for the trust that is the foundation of these systems.  The high 
levels of trust make these systems secure, desirable, and easy to use.  Transactions are 
“easier if the parties believe in each other’s basic honesty; there is less need to spell 
things out in lengthy contracts; less need to hedge against unexpected contingencies; 
fewer disputes and less need to litigate if disputes arise.”132   
As migrant workers move to various foreign countries, they form close-knit 
diasporas based on country of origin, common language and religion.  As migration 
continues, the diasporas grow and eventually develop distinct local ethnic communities 
within the greater community around them.  Often multiple generations or even multiple 
families may live in a single house.  Some have claimed that this is due to economic 
reasons, but it would improper to think that this was the only consideration.133  Studies of 
 
130 Sharma, 112; McCulloch and Pickering, 479; Ballard, Hawala Transformed. 
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the Pakistani and Indian populations in Britain have shown that although most of the 
individuals in these groups have been in Britain for a relatively long period of time, and 
are fully acquainted with the British lifestyle, the vast majority still conduct their personal 
affairs based on the “cultural, moral, and linguistic conventions which are primarily 
inspired by their South Asian ancestral heritage.”134  IFTS rely on these social dynamics 
and function to preserve the cultural traditions.   
In addition to the traditional reasons for use of IFTS, there are also some very 
practical reasons why they are used, especially among new migrant workers.  These 
include language barriers, lower education and literacy rates, fear of unknown banking 
systems, and illegal immigration issues.135  The local IFTS operator plays a significant 
role in alleviating these concerns and meeting the cultural needs of their clients.  These 
operators are usually a mainstay of the local community and develop close relationships 
with their clients over time.  The operators often become part of a larger extended family 
which serves to fortify the trust in the system.136 
Another cultural issue concerns the family members living in their home country.  
Often times, women and children will stay while the men migrate for work.  The social 
norms and traditions in many societies, especially in the rural villages, only allow women 
to have minimal interactions with people outside their immediate community.  Therefore 
women cannot use banks or the post office to conduct business.  In order to transfer funds 
in these situations, a trusted person from the community is needed to complete the 
transaction and deliver the funds.137 
All of these cultural issues that encourage individuals to use IFTS also serve to 
strengthen the overall system and provide the security and reliability in the system.  Since 
these systems are informal and illegal in most countries, there is no legal entity that 
individuals can go to in order to solve a dispute.  Hence why trust in so important in these 
systems.  IFTS transactions can be viewed as a series of interactions.  Depending on the 
 
134 Ballard, A Background Report on the Operation of Informal Value Transfer Systems (Hawala). 
135 El-Qorchi, et al., 8. 
136 Razavy, 285. 
137 El-Qorchi, et al., 8. 
 44
                                                
amount and destination of a transaction, there may be a couple or many individual 
interactions that take place to complete the transaction.  With each interaction along the 
way, each person is trusting that the next will fulfill their obligation.138  Since it is 
common for IFTS operators to have varying levels of credit and debit with other 
operators, what ensures that an opportunistic operator will not wait until he has a large 
store of cash and then disappear with the money?   
As noted, IFTS operators are usually part of the local community, and therefore 
have regular interaction with their clients, whether business or personal.  Given this high 
level of interconnectedness, along with the fact that IFTS operators gain and maintain 
business through their reputation, the likelihood of cheating is minimal.  Because of the 
close personal connections involved in these systems, information travels fast.  Any 
misconduct would quickly become known throughout the system and the guilty party 
would face severe punishment.  According to one operator, no one cheats because “if one 
does, then the small gain would not be worth the bigger price…You will lose respect, and 
for a man, honor is his most important asset.”139   
To further understand the security and reliability in the systems, especially during 
the interactions that occur with intermediaries who do not have a personal relationship 
with the clients, the system as a whole can be viewed as a self-enforcing exchange 
mechanism or as a homogenous economic club.140  Both of these concepts look at the 
social cost of operating in the system, and the flow of information through the system.  
The cultural underpinnings of IFTS do not allow anyone to just become an operator in the 
system.  One must be recommended and brought into the system by someone who is 
already established.  The new member then has initial credibility and a reputation based 
on the sponsor.  The high investment in social capital helps to stabilize the system and 
gives each member a strong incentive to act in accordance with established norms.141 
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The multitude of transactions that occur in the system and the continually 
changing credits and debits between the operators allow ample opportunity for 
information to flow through the system.  Each operator has an incentive to accurately 
report on their dealings and on the reputations of others in the system.  Any false 
accusations or attempts to cheat will become known due to the multiple connections 
among the operators.  This rarely occurs due to the threat of being expelled from the 
system and losing one’s social standing in the community.  Accurate reporting on the 
other hand increases one’s reputation and improves the chances that others will continue 
to conduct business with him.  Therefore, security and reliability are ensured because of 
the “social embeddedness of the institutional structure.”142   
2. Religion 
Religious concerns are not a consideration for all IFTS, but are significant for 
some, primarily hawala.  Also, given that many migrant workers come from 
predominantly Muslim regions, even if the particular IFTS they are using in not hawala, 
it is likely an offshoot of hawala and still influenced by Islamic principles.  The hawala 
system is integral to the social-religious aspects of Islamic society in which decisions 
about usage of particular institutions is not solely based on financial or economic 
considerations; “the Koran encourages Muslims to build financial relationships based on 
trust rather than contract.”143  The Koran and hadiths, words and deeds of Mohammed 
that were passed orally for centuries, legitimize and endorse the concept of hawala and 
define the conditions or requirements that must be met to validate a transaction.  While 
some of the customs that have been passed down by the hadiths may appear to be very 
different from the practices seen today, religious leaders continue to adapt them and teach 
the proper methods for the use of hawala so as meet the intent of financial transfers which 
was endorsed by the Prophet Mohammed.144    
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An important aspect to note with Islamic culture is the view that shari’a law is a 
supranational code and is above any secular legal jurisdiction.  In theory then, shari’a can 
justify and validate any transaction regardless of borders or secular jurisdictions.  For 
example, in the U.S. financial institutions are required to report transactions greater than 
$10,000; if a hawala dealer (assuming he is licensed as a money service business) decides 
to operate under shari’a law, then he is not obligated to report any transaction regardless 
of the amount.  However, in reality, shari’a is limited in its ability to accomplish this 
because there is no single entity to enforce it and it is not recognized by many economic 
institutions.145  Therefore, despite its theoretical claim, shari’a is only enforceable within 
smaller religious communities that recognize its validity and are willing to abide by its 
principles.   
The notion of shari’a as a supranational code and the validity of hawala as a 
banking system were reiterated in 2005 by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Seestani.  When 
questioned regarding the legitimacy of hawala within a nation in which it is outlawed, 
Seestani replied, “it is necessary to observe the law which has been approved by a 
Hakim-e Shar’a (an Islamic judge).”146  The level to which hawala is engrained in the 
Muslim culture and the direct reference to its use in shari’a law helps explain the 
significant amounts of money that are transferred around the world every year.147 
In addition to the required use of hawala by the Koran and hadiths, there is also a 
social aspect to its use.  According to Islam, Allah controls wealth, and therefore those 
with wealth are obligated to fulfill a social duty by helping the poor and disadvantaged 
within the society.  This obligation extends to expatriates and encourages them to send 
remittances back to their families.  Fulfilling this obligation is highly valued, and 
therefore those that do enjoy an elevated social status within their community.148 
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E. SUMMARY 
The expanding trade routes in the Middle East and South Asia during the 
medieval period along with the uncertainty and insecurity of conducting business in 
distant areas provided the basis for traditional IFTS.  Although the rise of the modern 
banking system diminished the use of traditional IFTS for a time, the economic and 
social factors tied to these systems allowed them to persevere.  As the modern banking 
system continued to develop and spread across the world, it often bypassed the 
developing nations.  This created a significant problem for many workers who migrated 
to the developed world to provide the labor force for the global economy.  The sudden 
and massive resurgence of traditional IFTS to fill the void left by the formal banking 
system is an indication of the strong economic and social factors that influence their use.  
The ability of traditional IFTS to provide low cost, secure, and reliable transfers to 
remote areas is a significant incentive for their use.  When this is combined with the 
cultural and religious requirements regarding monetary transactions, the overriding 
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IV. MODERN IFTS 
A. ORIGIN 
Modern informal funds transfer systems developed in the 1950-1970 timeframe.  
Unlike traditional IFTS, these systems rarely have a legitimate use, especially in their 
current form.  They were originally formed as a response to restrictive government 
monetary policies.  The increasing volume of global trade and the development of 
parallel foreign exchange markets, combined with technological advancements in 
communication and banking services, allowed businesses to manipulate trade transactions 
in order to circumvent currency controls and taxes.  In addition to simple trade 
manipulation to avoid currency controls and taxes, these systems have also become 
primary mechanisms for conducting money laundering.  The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimates that between 2% and 5% of the global gross domestic product is 
laundered through these systems, which equates to between $600 billion and $1.5 trillion 
every year.149  Modern IFTS have continued to evolve over the past few decades and 
have become very sophisticated.   
There are essentially three methods criminals can use to move money and attempt 
to hide its origins.  First, they can use the financial system to transfer funds through 
multiple accounts, national and international, using various methods, such as checks and 
wire transfers.  Second, they can physically move currency to different locations and 
across international borders.  Third, they can manipulate trade transactions to transfer 
value without actually moving any currency.  The first two methods have been given 
considerable attention by FATF and other national and international agencies and  
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organizations over the past decade.150  Due to the increased risk of detection and capture 
when using the first two methods, criminals began to move towards greater use of trade 
manipulation to transfer their funds. 
The international trade system has become attractive to criminals for a variety of 
reasons.  The rapid expansion of global trade along with the limited ability countries have 
to accurately track, verify, and inspect imports and exports have created many 
vulnerabilities that criminals are capitalizing on.  Global merchandise trade exceeds $9 
trillion and research has shown that less than 5% of all cargo is inspected by customs 
officials.151  The huge volume of trade, combined with the complexity of multiple 
foreign exchange transactions, limited exchange of customs information between 
countries, and commingling of legitimate and illegitimate funds has created an 
environment which is highly conducive
Trade based IFTS can range the full spectrum from relatively simple transactions 
between two colluding companies to complex transactions involving multiple criminal, 
business, and banking entities; the best known of these being the Black Market Peso 
Exchange system in Colombia.  A further distinction can also be made with trade-based 
systems regarding the criminal intent involved.  First, legitimate businesses may use these 
systems to transfer otherwise legal profits in order to avoid currency controls and taxes.  
Second, criminal organizations can use these systems to conduct trade-based money 
laundering in order to disguise the source of their illegal funds.152 
1. Basic Trade Manipulation 
A variety of basic methods can be used by either legitimate businesses or 
criminals to transfer funds by misrepresenting the price, quantity, or quality of the 
 
150 Trade Based Money Laundering, Financial Action Task Force, 23 June 2006, http://www.fatf-
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merchandise.  Although the purpose for using these systems may be different, tax evasion 
vs. money laundering, the same methods can be used by either group to accomplish their 
goals.  The most common methods include over- and under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, 
falsification of invoices, and over- and under-shipments.153  All of these systems require 
the collusion of both the import and export company.  In addition, the proliferation of 
large multi-national corporations allows these systems to be used internally to shift 
taxable income from high tax to low tax jurisdictions.  Multiple studies have highlighted 
the incentives companies have to move income when they are operating in various 
locations with different tax rates.154  By over- and under-invoicing imports and exports 
between affiliate companies, income can be transferred to the lower tax jurisdictions. 
An importer can receive value from the exporter by having the merchandise 
invoiced below market value.  Alternatively, an exporter can receive value from the 
importer by invoicing the merchandise above market value.  In the first case, if the 
importer pays a unit cost of $1 for one million items and the fair value is $2 per item, the 
importer will have paid $1 million for $2 million worth of goods.  When the merchandise 
is sold, the importer will have a net gain of $1 million.  For over-invoicing, the funds will 
flow to the exporter.  In this case, using the same $2 fair price, the exporter will charge 
$3 per unit and receive $3 million from the importer.  After paying the $2 million in 
initial expenses for the merchandise, the exporter is left with a net gain of $1 million.  In 
a money laundering operation, the remaining $1 million can now be distributed back to 
the originator through bank accounts or used to buy goods and services on behalf of the 
originator.  By manipulating the trade system, the money now appears to have come from 
a legitimate source and will be very difficult to track.155 
This same basic premise used for under- and over-invoicing is used for 
falsification of invoices and over- and under-shipments.  When using the method of 
multiple invoicing, the importer will pay the exporter multiple times for the same 
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shipment of goods.   By using a variety of payment methods and financial institutions, it 
becomes very difficult to track these payments to the same shipment.  Also, there is no 
need to misrepresent any of the data on the price, quality, or quantity of the goods.  This 
will further reduce any suspicion about the validity of the transaction.156  In all of these 
cases of basic manipulation, the requirement for collusion is obvious.  The fundamental 
premise for the system to work is that both companies understand and agree to the 
manipulation.  
2. Black Market Peso Exchange 
Contrary to many recent reports, the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange did 
not originate to service the illegal drug industry.  BMPE arose in the 19501950s because 
of overly restrictive monetary policies implemented by the government.  These policies 
raised taxes and tariffs, thereby raising the cost of conducting business, and prohibited 
individuals and companies from holding U.S. dollars.  Businesses had to go through the 
central bank in order to get a letter of credit to buy foreign merchandise.  In order to get 
this letter, the taxes and fees had to be paid first, which could be 21% to 39% of the total 
transaction amount.157  In addition, the government would now have a record of the 
amount and type of merchandise a business was buying or selling.  These records could 
then be used to audit end of year tax returns to ensure the proper taxes were being 
paid.158  These factors led to the creation of an unofficial parallel market, or black 
market.   
To facilitate this black market, peso brokers would act as intermediaries between 
importers and exporters.  Colombian exporters would sell their merchandise in the United 
States and be paid in dollars by the U.S. companies.  However, since Colombians could 
not hold dollars, the exporters did not want to bring the money back into the country.  If 
the funds were returned, they would have to be deposited in the central bank, and that 
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would require the taxes and fees to be paid.  To avoid this, the exporters would sell their 
dollars to the peso brokers and then instruct the U.S. companies to deposit the payments 
into a U.S. account controlled by the broker.  The peso broker would then pay the 
exporter in local currency.  This would complete the first half of the process; the exporter 
now had his money in local currency and the peso broker had dollars in a U.S. 
account.159 
In order to continue this business, the peso broker needed a continual supply of 
pesos.  To meet this need, the peso broker would sell the dollars to a Columbian importer.  
The importer would pay for the dollars using the local currency that was generated from 
selling the imported merchandise.  Once the dollars were purchased, the importer would 
instruct the broker to make payments to the U.S. companies he had ordered products 
from.  The peso broker would then transfer funds from his U.S. accounts to the U.S. 
companies.  By purchasing the dollars from the peso broker, the importer could now 
smuggle the goods into the country and avoid all taxes and tariffs.  Since the importer did 
not go through the central bank to fund the transaction, there would be no official record 
of the imports.  The process was now complete; the importer was able to buy the 
merchandise without the central bank and the peso broker had a fresh supply of pesos to 
sell to the next exporter.160  
BMPE continued to grow and became very efficient at transferring funds and 
smuggling merchandise.  It remained primarily a tax avoidance and tax evasion system 
for the importers and exporters until the early 1980s.  As the drug trafficking industry 
expanded and Colombia eventually became the leading exporter of cocaine to the United 
States, the traffickers needed a system to retrieve illegal funds held in the United States.  
The enormous volume of cash that was generated combined with tighter banking 
restrictions and reporting requirements, made the transfer of funds back to Colombia 
increasingly difficult.161  The traffickers recognized the efficiency and utility of the 
BMPE and began to use it as the primary means of recovering their drug proceeds. 
 
159 Senate Caucus, The Black Market Peso Exchange, 50-51, 58, 65-67. 
160 Ibid., 50-52, 65-67. 
161 Ibid., 51-52.  
 54
                                                
The present day system continues to work as described above, except now it is the 
traffickers that are the primary source of dollars in the U.S., not the Colombian exporters.  
The peso brokers now buy the dollars from the traffickers and pay them with the pesos 
that are received from the importers.  The primary problem this has caused for the peso 
brokers is how to place the hundreds of millions of dollars in cash into the formal 
banking system so that it can be used by the importers.  In order to accomplish this and 
not raise suspicion with the banks, the peso broker may control up to a hundred different 
bank accounts in the U.S.  The broker uses a team of agents in the U.S. to collect the cash 
from the trafficker’s stash houses and deliver it to the banks.  By using various methods, 
the agents are able to place the funds into multiple accounts without raising suspicion or 
exceeding reporting limits.  Some brokers have also begun to collude with U.S. money 
transmitter businesses to mix the illegal funds with the legal funds that are being 
transmitted to Colombia.  After the funds are commingled in the money transmitter’s 
accounts, the illegal funds are later separated out and transferred to one of the peso 
brokers U.S. accounts.162  The Black Market Peso Exchange has grown to be the largest 
money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere and is considered the “most 
dangerous and damaging form of money laundering that we have ever encountered.”163   
BMPE essentially consists of two systems, one on the U.S. side and one on the 
Colombian side.  As illustrated in Figure 1, these systems remain separate with the only 
interaction being the transfer of value from one side to the other.  The peso broker is the 
facilitator of these two systems and orchestrates the transfer of value between them.164  
The individual users of the system, drug traffickers and Colombian importers, are not 
involved in the specific transfers, which greatly reduces their risk of being tied to the 
money laundering scheme.  In this system, the peso broker assumes all the risk for 
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performing the transfers, while the users just conduct their individual business and 
provide a constant source of funds for the peso broker.   
 
Figure 2.  
                                                
 Black Market Peso Exchange System165 
 
The interaction of the four main entities in this system, the peso brokers, drug 
traffickers, Colombian importers, and banks, highlights the two major differences 
between BMPE and the basic trade manipulation systems.  First, BMPE involves a much 
higher level of complexity in moving the funds.  Whereas in the basic systems, funds 
transfers are initiated through simple manipulation of paperwork; in BMPE, extremely 
large sums of cash must be placed into the formal banking system without raising 
suspicion.  These funds then must be transferred to multiple companies and appear to 
come from a legitimate source.  Second, in BMPE there is no collusion with the 
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exporting companies.  The U.S. companies must believe that the funds they receive  
for payment are from a legal and valid source.166 
Although BMPE is profoundly different from traditional IFTS, its structure and 
operation allow it to have many of the same characteristics as traditional IFTS; primarily 
cost, convenience, reliability, and anonymity.  Similar to traditional IFTS, these 
characteristics are largely based on the trust that is found in the system.  Unlike 
traditional IFTS, however, this trust in not from any cultural or social ties, and it is often 
enforced with the threat of violence.  Nevertheless, there is a high degree of trust with 
payments often being made to one party or another before all the individual transactions 
are complete.167  Also contributing to these characteristics is the fact that the informal 
and simplistic nature of communication and record keeping seen in traditional IFTS are 
well established in the process of BMPE.168 
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The primary motive behind modern IFTS is the economic incentive.  By avoiding 
currency controls, taxes, and tariffs, companies not only save money, but they also get a 
competitive advantage over other companies that abide by the government policies.  In 
theory, these systems could be mitigated with sound economic policies, however, with 
the introduction of illegal drug money, changes in policy alone are unlikely to control 
them. The expansion of the international economy, the increase in the global illegal drug 
market, and the formation of parallel foreign exchange markets have caused modern 
IFTS to become a global phenomenon.   The techniques of basic trade manipulation as 
well as the principles of the Black Market Peso Exchange have expanded beyond Latin 
America and are now seen in almost every region of the world.169 
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The basis of most modern IFTS is the creation of a parallel foreign exchange 
market.  Basic trade manipulation can occur without it, but more complex systems such 
as BMPE require it.  These black markets allow for the purchase and sale of foreign 
currency outside the legal financial system.  The principle reason these markets exist is 
government policies affecting the official currency markets, taxes, and tariffs.170  When a 
country has a balance of payments deficit, there will often be an excess demand for 
foreign exchange.  This will be followed by government policies to control the access to 
foreign exchange in an attempt to conserve foreign reserves and increase the demand for 
domestic products.171  While the government must attempt to stabilize the economy and 
implement policies to reduce the deficit, especially in developing and transition nations, 
if these policies are not managed carefully they can have significant long term negative 
effects on the nation.  As restrictions are imposed, inflation rates will rise and the official 
exchange rate will become overvalued, which leads to a further increase in the balance of 
payments deficit.  If this process continues, a black market will emerge.172  The extent 
and importance of the black market will depend on the length and severity of the 
monetary restrictions.  If the conditions that caused the situation are not solved or if the 
restrictions are severe enough, use of the black market can become so engrained in 
personal and business dealings that it will continue to be used even if the situation is 
eventually fixed, although probably at a lesser level.173 
Many developing nations fit this pattern in the 1950-1980 timeframe.  Latin 
America as a whole experienced vary degrees of black markets since that time due to 
restricted access to foreign currency.  In recent years, some countries have managed to 
control the black markets through economic liberalization and sound monetary policies.  
In others, such as Colombia and Brazil, the black market became so pervasive that even 
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with economic liberalization it remained a part of the business culture.174  Eventually 
these policies may have significantly reduced the use of the black market, but the 
introduction of drug money into the system has negated most of the economic policies 
and ensured that the black market will continue for the foreseeable future. 
Access to foreign currency, liberal trade policies, and lower taxes and tariffs 
should bring many businesses back to the official markets as the incentive to use the 
black market is reduced.  However, when the drug cartels are willing to sell their dollars 
at a significant discount, 20% - 40% below the official exchange rate, the peso brokers 
are still able to give the importers a much better deal. 175  Access to essentially limitless 
amounts of cheap dollars, plus the ability to avoid taxes and tariffs, ensures that modern 
IFTS will continue regardless of government policies.  The continued use and growth of 
modern IFTS has considerable micro and macroeconomic impacts on a country.  
Whereas traditional IFTS had positive and negative economic impact, modern IFTS have 
predominantly negative economic impact. 
1. Microeconomic Issues 
The primary microeconomic impacts of modern IFTS are the effect they have on 
communities and small business.  Although these systems are mainly used by businesses, 
they can have a large impact on individuals within a community.  Individuals are affected 
in three ways; by a reduction in basic services, loss of productive employment, and 
corruption of government officials.  The corruption aspect will be discussed further in the 
section on social factors.  The loss of tax revenue at all levels of government puts a 
severe financial strain on communities.  In the case of Colombia, it is estimated that local 
governments lose approximately $500 million per year in tax revenue due to the 
smuggling of merchandise.  This loss directly affects the government’s ability to provide 
basic services for the population, such as health care, education, sanitation, and social 
 
174 Grosse, “Peru’s Black Market in Foreign Exchange,” 155; Grosse, Drugs and Money, 41-42; 
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programs.  The high loss at the local level has caused the central government to transfer 
54% of the nation’s ordinary income to the provinces to help them maintain these 
services. 176 
The loss of productive employment is associated with the impact these systems 
have on small business.  Legitimate businesses are adversely affected in two ways.  First, 
modern IFTS increase the size and scope of the informal economy.  The importers using 
these systems, and the companies they conduct business with, gain a competitive 
advantage over compliant companies since the merchandise they are selling is either 
smuggled or under-invoiced.177  Second, criminals often establish front companies to 
help launder their illegal funds, or they establish “legitimate” businesses which they will 
subsidize with the proceeds from their criminal act.178  In both of these situations, 
legitimate businesses are negatively impacted and often they either go bankrupt or are 
forced to use the IFTS themselves in order to compete. 
The detrimental impact of the first scenario involving an increase in the informal 
economy is clearly seen with the example of the Colombian footwear industry.  In 1998 
nine million pairs of shoes were “legally” imported.  However, two million were claimed 
to be worth less than $2, five million were valued less than $1, and one million were 
actually invoiced at three cents a pair.  In addition, it is believed that another 30 million 
were smuggled into the country in the same year.  Almost all of these shoes were then 
sold in the informal economy at greatly discounted prices.  The effect of this has been 
staggering on the footwear industry.  Prior to this, during the early 1990s, there were six 
major shoe factories in Colombia with each one employing approximately 1500 workers.  
In 1999, there were only two remaining.  The other four had gone bankrupt, and the two 
that did remain were only operating at 40% capacity.179 
The second scenario regarding the establishment of businesses by criminals 
involved with IFTS also has harmful effects on the community and business sector in 
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which they are formed.  In order to legitimize the funds or protect their proceeds, funds 
will often be invested in financial activities that are neither needed nor economically 
beneficial for the area.180  Criminals are not interested in profit generation at this point, 
but they do want/need the funds to appear as legitimate as possible.  The creation of 
“legitimate” businesses is one more layer they can transfer the funds through to make 
them appear to have a legitimate origin.  These businesses are harmful because they are 
being subsidized with illegal funds.181  The massive amounts of money involved allow 
the businesses to offer services and merchandise far below market rates.  This will 
eventually drive the legitimate businesses out, creating higher unemployment and further 
reducing tax revenue.  In some countries, these businesses have come to control entire 
sectors within a community or region.182 
2. Macroeconomic Issues 
The enormous sums of money moving through modern IFTS has vastly expanded 
the scope of the problem to the point were these systems can have a significant 
macroeconomic impact on a country.  The primary issue with modern IFTS is the 
negative effect they have on the growth of the national economy.  This occurs from the 
impact these systems have on the national tax system and their expanding use in the 
business sector.  While these two areas are each individually affected by IFTS, there is 
also a compounding effect since the business use undermines other legitimate businesses 
and thereby creates a greater tax deficit.  Modern IFTS have grown to such sophistication 
and extent, that if they remain unchecked, they have the potential to “erode the integrity 
of a nation’s financial institutions…and undermine national economies.”183 
A study conducted on 18 industrialized nations found an inverse relationship 
between GDP growth and the extent of money laundering.  The study concluded that 
“significant reductions in annual GDP growth rates were associated with increases in the 
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laundering of criminal proceeds.”184  In addition, some small or emerging market 
countries may be overwhelmed by the amount of illegal funds in the country.  In some 
cases, these funds can eclipse the entire national budget, which may result in the loss of 
economic control by the government.  
Trade based IFTS severely impact the tax systems of all nations.  Studies show 
that under-invoicing in developing nations from 1977-1983 accounted for 20% of the 
total export value.  Under-invoicing from South America to the United States reached $4 
billion in 1995, and over-invoicing of merchandise from the U.S. to Greece in 2001 cost 
the Greek government $2 billion in lost tax revenue.  Further, the United States lost a 
total of $42.7 billion in tax revenue in 1999 due to trade manipulation. 185  In Colombia, 
25% of all imports are estimated to be smuggled.  This equates to between 2% and 3.5% 
of the Colombian GDP.  The combined effect of smuggling and under-invoicing created a 
total tax revenue loss of $840 million in 1998.186  Besides the direct economic impact of 
these losses, there is also a residual negative impact.  In order to compensate for these 
losses and to be able to continue to meet the needs of the population, governments will 
generally impose overall higher tax rates than would otherwise be necessary.  This 
exacerbates the problems at the microeconomic level since the law-abiding individuals 
and businesses now have to pay an even higher tax rate.187 
The microeconomic impact of IFTS use in the business sector can expand until it 
has macroeconomic consequences.  This occurs through two primary methods; the 
continual growth of criminally subsidized businesses and expansion of the black markets 
for merchandise.  First, the criminal based businesses can easily continue to grow 
because of the volume of money supporting them.  Again, they are not attempting to 
make a profit, only to make the funds appear legitimate.  If it is in the interest of the 
criminals, they can grow the business until it completely controls the entire industry 
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within a given region.188  Although this alone will have a large negative impact, the real 
damage is done when the criminals decide they are no longer interested in or need the 
business.  When these businesses are abandoned, the entire sector is likely to fail and 
cause immense damage to the economy.189 
An example of this first situation involves a drug trafficker who establishes a 
business in Colombia to sell goods.  Instead of using a peso broker to convert the illegal 
funds, the trafficker can now use the money in the United States to buy merchandise from 
a U.S. producer.  At this time there are likely other importers who are also buying 
merchandise from this producer.  If those importers are operating legitimately and paying 
the appropriate taxes and fees, the trafficker will have an immediate advantage for two 
reasons.  First, he is not paying a discount to the peso broker, and second he is smuggling 
the merchandise into Colombia and avoiding the taxes and fees.190   
Now the trafficker can sell the goods at the wholesale price, or he may even be 
willing to take a slight loss on the goods.  The other importers who are selling the same 
merchandise will not be able to compete with these low prices and will be left with three 
options.  They can go bankrupt, begin to use IFTS to evade taxes and currency controls, 
or they can sell their business to the trafficker.  Because of the unfair economic 
advantage, the trafficker will soon control the majority of this industry.  The business will 
continue to expand as the other importers are forced out of this industry and the trafficker 
becomes the primary importer of goods from the particular U.S. producer.  The region in 
which the trafficker operates, as well as the U.S. producer, will then be dependent on the 
trafficker’s business.  If the trafficker remains in business, he will hurt the economy by 
avoiding taxes on the large amount of imports and by increasing unemployment by 
driving the other companies out of business.  If the trafficker decides to abandon the 
business, the industry will collapse and create economic hardship for those dependent 
upon that merchandise.191 
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The second manner in which business use of IFTS can have a macroeconomic 
impact is through the expansion of the black markets for merchandise.  In Colombia, 
extensive shopping areas know as Sanandresitos rapidly expanded through the 1980s and 
1990s.  These shopping areas, which are located in most Colombian cities, for the most 
part only sell contraband merchandise; 26% of the trade GDP comes from these shopping 
centers.  Also, 61% of total sales from the Sanandresitos, totaling $1.2 billion, were from 
the sale of smuggled goods.  The expansion of these areas in recent years shows the tacit 
approval that the population gives to the illegal activities.  Although it is fairly common 
knowledge as to the origins of the merchandise, people continue to shop and buy 
products from these black market merchants.  To compete with the growing popularity of 
these areas, many legitimate businesses are now turning to IFTS to avoid taxes and buy 
contraband merchandise. 192 
Many countries continue to suffer from the economic impact of modern IFTS.  
From the individual level to the national level, these systems have harmful consequences.  
In Colombia, IFTS have had a large destabilizing effect on the economy.  The extensive 
use of these systems has created an unemployment rate of 19% and has reduced the 
ability of the national and local governments to properly provide the basic services for the 
population.193  In addition, the vast amounts of drug money have negated many of the 
economic polices that could have mitigated the use of IFTS.  Changes in economic 
policies alone are no longer sufficient to end the detrimental effects of these systems. 
C. SOCIAL FACTORS 
Unlike traditional informal funds transfer systems, there are no overriding social 
reasons to use modern IFTS.  Modern systems were born out of business necessity and 
greed, based on government policies and the ability to manipulate trade transactions.  
While there are no social reasons to use the modern systems, they do have a social 
impact.  As with the other consequences of modern IFTS, the social impact is also 
negative.  The primary social impact is the corruption that occurs because of these 
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systems.  Corruption “diverts scarce resources away from public purposes, jeopardizes 
the ability of governments to achieve their agenda, directly affects the spending on 
priority sectors such as education and health, and can have a particularly damaging 
impact on growth.”194  Throughout much of Latin America, the expansion of IFTS in the 
past two decades and the infusion of the drug cartels have allowed corruption to permeate 
all levels of society.195 
The economic power transferred to criminals through the use of IFTS helps to 
give them a sense of legitimacy and respectability.  This immense economic power can 
have a “corrupting effect on all elements of society.”196  This is seen with the implied 
approval by the population for the continued use of the black markets.  Some claim that 
this shows a breakdown in public morality and can eventually lead to more serious 
effects.  Once it is acceptable to break one law, it becomes easier to break others.197  
Also, if corruption becomes widespread and the people think the government is no longer 
protecting their interests, there is little incentive for them to obey the laws.  At this point 
people will begin to look after their own self-interests and tend to migrate away from 
government services and agencies.198 
One of the main areas where corruption is rampant and has a considerable effect 
on IFTS is customs.  The customs agency plays a very important role in the economy of a 
nation.  Customs officials have a direct effect on the amount of tax revenue collected and 
the amount and type of goods that flow into a country.  For these reasons, corruption in 
the customs agency can have a large negative impact on a nation’s economy.  
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Unfortunately, customs is identified as the third most corrupt government agency and is 
cited as one of the largest barriers to conducting business.  Bribes have become 
commonplace, with the average bribe equaling 30% of the tax due.199   
Customs corruption, especially when tied to IFTS, can undermine entire sections 
of the tax system.  The value added tax (VAT) system in many countries in dependent on 
the customs agency to properly assess and collect the tax at the initial stage when the 
product enters the country.  If this is not done then the appropriate taxes cannot be 
collected as the merchandise moves through the distribution system.200  Through the use 
of bribes, many importers bypass the VAT system and sell their products in the black 
market.  Therefore, corruption in the customs agency directly affects the continued use of 
IFTS and contributes to the loss of tax revenue. 
D. SUMMARY 
Modern IFTS were developed out of greed in order to circumvent government 
policies and regulations.  Adverse national monetary policies created black markets for 
foreign exchange which importers and exporters could capitalize on.  Over the past few 
decades two sub-systems have evolved which further exploit the rise in the global trade 
and narcotics industries.  First, basic trade manipulation can occur between two colluding 
companies to avoid taxes and tariffs.  Second, complex systems such as the Black Market 
Peso Exchange can involve multiple knowing and unknowing entities to launder illicit 
proceeds and transfer funds.  Both of these systems have a severe negative impact on 
local, regional, and national economies.  In addition to the large tax revenue that is 
directly lost by the use of these systems, the effect is compounded by the competitive 
advantage given to companies using modern IFTS.  This advantage eventually drives 
legitimate businesses out which further decreases tax revenue and increases 
unemployment.  Furthermore, modern systems promote a certain level of acceptance for 
corruption and illegal activity.  Corruption, especially in customs agencies, can greatly 
facilitate the use and expansion of these systems. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Traditional and modern IFTS share many of the same characteristics, but that is 
the extent of the similarities between these two groups.  Traditional systems were 
developed to meet the legitimate needs of businesses and individuals and at times became 
the formal banking system within the Middle East and South Asia.  These systems have 
survived because of the strong economic and social factors influencing their use.  
Conversely, modern IFTS were developed purely as criminal systems and have no 
legitimate purpose.  These systems have continued due to the enormous amounts of 
illegal money generated and their ability to effectively launder proceeds form the global 
narcotics industry.  Whereas traditional systems have predominantly positive effects on 
the communities in which they operate, modern systems are the exact opposite and have 
predominantly negative effects.  
Over the past few decades, access to the modern banking system and the rise of 
globalization has had a profound effect on both traditional and modern IFTS, albeit in 
drastically different ways.  Whereas the limitations placed on migrant workers by these 
two factors led to a massive resurgence in the use of traditional IFTS for legitimate 
purposes; modern IFTS took advantage of these two factors to greatly expand criminal 
activity. 
B. INDICATORS 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the use of traditional and modern 
IFTS in order to identify the macro indicators and conditions responsible for their 
development and continued use.  Identifying these indicators will allow regional, national 
and international agencies and organizations to detect the emergence or presence of IFTS 
and focus their efforts to develop effective regulatory policies to limit the illegitimate use 
while maintaining the legitimate aspects of these systems. 
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Table 1 lists the macro indicators for traditional and modern IFTS respectively.  A 
brief description is then given highlighting why each of these is a potential indicator of 
the respective system.  Following the description, each indicator is given a degree of 
confidence based on the analysis of the research material.  While any of the high degree 
of confidence indicators may alone be sufficient to point towards the potential 
development or use of IFTS, none of these provides a “smoking gun.”  It will be a 
combination of these indicators that will provide the best evidence of the emergence or 
presence of IFTS in a particular region or industry.  With this knowledge, investigators 
can then focus on the specific region or industry and use the micro indicators that have 
been previously identified in the literature to find the individual system at work. 
 
Traditional IFTS Modern IFTS 
Change in Government Monetary Policies Change in Government Monetary Policies 
Access to the Formal Banking System Extent of Black Markets 
Change in Formal Remittance Flows Third Party Payments to Exporters 
Licensing and Regulatory Requirements  Corruption Levels 
Size and Development of Diasporas Negative Regional Economic Factors 
Standard of Living in Rural Areas  
Table 3.   IFTS Indicators 
 
1. Traditional IFTS 
a. Change in Government Monetary Policies 
A government’s response to a national economic situation will greatly 
affect the amount of money that will flow through traditional IFTS, for personal and 
legitimate business use.  The overall impact of the government’s response will be 
primarily based on the degree of currency control imposed.  Restrictions on access to 
foreign currency or convertibility will create a gap between the official and unofficial rate 
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of exchange.  This gap is what IFTS operators capitalize on and is the main factor in their 
ability to offer very low cost service.  More severe restrictions will cause this gap to 
increase and therefore encourage greater use of IFTS.  Degree of Confidence: High. 
b. Access to the Formal Banking System 
The economic and social “requirement” for individuals and businesses to 
transfer money for legitimate purposes dictates that there will be a means to accomplish 
this.  Multiple studies regarding the flow of money into developing nations highlight the 
importance of having a secure and reliable method to conduct the transfer.  Although 
there may be access to the formal system for the sender, this is often no true for the 
recipient.  Without access to a formal system on both sides of the transaction, which is 
fast, low cost, secure, and reliable, there will be continued development and use of IFTS.  
Degree of Confidence: High. 
c. Change in Formal Remittance Flows 
While the amount of money moving through informal systems cannot be 
directly measured, trends can be estimated by using the data on formal remittances and 
migration patterns to and from specific countries.  Given the overall consistency of 
remittances, a rise or fall in the total amount within the formal system for a particular 
country, without a corresponding rise or fall in migrant workers, is likely associated with 
a change in the method of transfer.  While the decision to change between formal and 
informal methods of transfer are probably linked to some of the other factors listed here, 
there could be additional reasons not brought out by the current research.  In this case, the 
only way to know if an informal system has developed, expanded, or declined may be by 
monitoring changes in the formal systems.  Degree of Confidence: High. 
d. Licensing and Regulatory Requirements 
Licensing and regulatory requirements for financial institutions have 
evolved around the formal banking sector.  These requirements have not taken into 
account the unique nature and circumstances in which traditional IFTS operate.  This 
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issue was further complicated after September 11, with the across the board 
implementation of higher AML and CFT procedures for all financial institutions.  While 
the government’s position is understandable, IFTS have always operated in the informal 
sector, and therefore, increased regulatory requirements alone are not going to change 
that.  As long as the government continues with a heavy-handed approach towards IFTS 
operators, the operators will continue to find ways to avoid detection and continue their 
business in the informal sector.  Degree of Confidence: Moderate. 
e. Size and Development of Diasporas 
Common social and cultural backgrounds provide the foundation for the 
formation of diasporas.  As the levels of migration increase, the size and development of 
diasporas in the developed nations also increase.  Barriers to use of the formal banks such 
as language, legal status, and proof of identity, along with the cultural and religious 
aspects of handling monetary transactions, ensures that alternative methods of 
transferring money will be found.  As the need for an acceptable method of transfer 
increases, local businessmen will use the social network of the community to connect 
with family and friends in their country of origin.  Through these connections, IFTS will 
be formed and operated within the diasporas.  The greater the size and development of 
the diasporas, the higher the probability of IFTS formation and use.  Degree of 
Confidence: Moderate. 
f. Standard of Living in Rural Areas 
Traditional IFTS can have a large impact on the local community in which 
remittances are received.  In some cases, remittances may account for the majority of 
funds moving into a region.  Although remittances are sent to a particular family, as the 
money is spent it is spread throughout the community and can have a strong positive 
effect on the entire local economy.  Changes in the standard of living can also be 




factors.  Therefore, increases in the standard of living in rural areas may be an indicator 
of IFTS use within a region, but only when the other factors are accounted for.  Degree of 
Confidence: Low to Moderate. 
2. Modern IFTS 
a. Change in Government Monetary Policies 
Government policies affecting the official currency market, taxes, and 
tariffs are the principle reason for the formation of modern IFTS.  Adverse changes in 
these policies drive the creation of foreign exchange black markets and increase the 
incentive to manipulate trade transactions.  Currency black markets, especially when 
fueled by a near endless supply of cheap money from the narcotics industry, and invoice 
manipulation provide a large economic advantage to businesses that use them.  The more 
severe the changes in monetary policy are, the greater the probability of IFTS formation 
and use.  Degree of Confidence: High.  
b. Extent of Black Markets 
Black markets for merchandise are a direct result of contraband 
merchandise entering the country.  Modern IFTS feed these markets with the 
merchandise that is smuggled in through BMPE and that which is brought in through 
trade manipulation to avoid taxes and tariffs.  The competitive advantage the black 
market merchants gain eventually drives many legitimate businesses out, thereby 
increasing the market share for the black markets.  Extensive use and acceptance of black 
markets for merchandise, therefore, is a good indicator of the existence of modern IFTS.  
Degree of Confidence: High. 
c. Third Party Payments to Exporters 
Importers using the Black Market Pesos Exchange are dependent on third 
party entities to make payments to their suppliers.  These payments are made by a variety 
of methods, such as wire transfers, cashiers check, or bulk cash shipments.  Often the 
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origination of these payments has no obvious connection to the importer.  This is because 
the payments are being initiated by the peso broker on behalf of the importer.  Suspicious 
payments that cannot be directly tied to the importer are a good indicator of IFTS use.  
Degree of Confidence: High. 
d. Corruption Levels 
The level of corruption within a region, especially in the customs agency, 
will have a considerable impact on the formation and use of modern IFTS.  Criminals 
rely on being able to bribe officials in order to ease the process of importing contraband 
merchandise or to not investigate illegal activities.  Customs is the third most corrupt 
government agency and is one the largest barrier to conducting legitimate business.  Also, 
widespread corruption can lead to a breakdown in public morality regarding the need to 
obey the laws.  Individuals and businesses may then feel justified in their use of these 
systems.  Therefore, high levels of corruption are likely associated with the formation and 
use of modern IFTS.  Degree of Confidence: Moderate. 
e. Negative Regional Economic Factors 
Modern IFTS can have a large negative impact on a region by increasing 
unemployment, increasing bankruptcies, and decreasing tax revenues.  Extensive use of 
IFTS in a region can cause these issues to occur during otherwise stable economic times.  
While the combination of all three issues could be a strong indicator of IFTS use, each 
issue alone can also be indicator.  Nevertheless, in order to be valid indicators of IFTS 
use, other government, economic, and social factors that could affect these issues must be 
accounted for.  Therefore, while unemployment, bankruptcies, and tax revenue all have 
the potential to be indicators of IFTS use, the other factors contributing to these issues 
must be accounted for.  Degree of Confidence: Low to Moderate. 
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Traditional IFTS 
Current U.S. and international policies regarding traditional informal funds 
transfer systems are problematic and inconsistent.  These systems were automatically 
demonized after September 11 without having a complete understanding of their use and 
operation.  Although they are vulnerable to criminal and terrorist use, this use has been 
shown to be extremely small in proportion to the legitimate use.201  The reaction after 
September 11 has been to increase regulation and transpose international formal banking 
requirements on all financial businesses.  This reaction is not appropriate for traditional 
IFTS.  Effective regulation must take into account the legitimate use of these systems and 
the economic and social factors influencing their use.  The primary goal of IFTS 
regulation should not be to prohibit their use or limit accessibility, but rather to formalize 
the existing process to increase transparency and accountability. 
The dynamic structure of IFTS requires consistent regulation to accurately track 
operators, customers, and transactions.  Due to the nature of these systems, traditional 
Western models of regulation will be ineffective and attempts to over-regulate will only 
serve to harm relations between operators and authorities.202  Regulators must understand 
that the formal banking system cannot meet the needs of many of the customers and 
therefore IFTS are a “special” class within the financial sector and need to be regulated as 
such.  International standards designed for large financial institutions cannot be hastily 
imposed upon the informal sector and realistically be expected to be implemented.  
Following is a list of recommendations which can be used to guide the development of 
effective, comprehensive, and beneficial policies for traditional IFTS, and to encourage 
users to move from the informal systems to the formal banking system.203 
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 Conduct outreach and consultation programs with IFTS operators and 
their customers.  Regulation is most effective when those being regulated 
are involved in the process. 
 Institute a special class of license for IFTS operators.  Reduce fees and 
bonding requirements to levels that are appropriate and realistic for these 
businesses. 
 Develop international standards that account for the specific domestic 
circumstances in which these systems operate. 
 Encourage national economic policies that limit the difference between the 
official and black market exchange rates. 
 Increase bank services in the regions where migrant workers are from.  
Also, encourage banks to implement changes which will increase 
competition in the areas of cost, speed, and reliability.   
 Provide incentives for migrant workers to use the formal system.  This 
may include matching a percentage of the amount deposited into a bank 
account, providing a higher interest rate for these accounts, and 
eliminating taxes on remittances. 
2. Modern IFTS 
Due to the exclusively criminal purpose of modern IFTS, regulatory 
considerations are vastly different from traditional IFTS.  In this case, efforts are needed 
to completely eliminate the use of these systems and prosecute anyone who is found 
using them.  Effective policies to stop modern IFTS must account for the various 
elements involved in their operation, including the bank industry, import and export 
businesses, black markets for currency and merchandise, corruption, and the narcotics 
industry.  Obviously this is a wide range of topics and no single policy will account for 
all of them.  Therefore, it is vital for policy makers to maintain a broad view of the 
problem and design complementary policies that will work against not only the individual 
areas, but also against the connections between them. 
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Since the proceeds from narcotics industry has become such an integral part of 
many of these systems, special attention to the flow of drugs is needed.  While 
considerable effort has been made on both the supply and demand side to curb the use of 
drugs, the majority of effort is usually against the supply side.  This mentality must be 
reversed; “never in history has there been a black market defeated from the supply 
side…as long as demand persists, the market will be served.”204  The drug industry is 
only one aspect of the problem, but it is the most influential.  Following is a list of 
recommendations which can be used to guide the development of effective policies to 
target the various aspects on modern IFTS.205 
 Encourage national economic policies that limit the development of black 
markets for foreign exchange.  
 Greater education for the banking industry and businesses regarding the 
method of payment involved in BMPE.  Increase scrutiny of incoming 
payments from foreign businesses to ensure they are from a valid source 
legally associated with the foreign company. 
 Decrease corruption in the customs agencies through greater transparency 
of records and increased supervision. 
 Increase the quantity and quality of the data available to customs agents.  
Encourage greater utilization of programs to track invoice prices versus 
market prices. 
 Increase international knowledge and cooperation against money 
laundering. 
 Greater enforcement against black markets for merchandise. 
 Focus narcotics control efforts in the demand countries. 
 
204 Munshani. 
205 Steven L. Peterson, “Achieving A Sustained Response To Money Laundering,” ed. Jonathan 
Schaffer, Economic Perspectives 6 (2001): 15, usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0501/ijee/ijee0501.pdf 
(accessed 16 October 2008); Grosse, Drugs and Money, 23-25; Senate Caucus, The Black Market Peso 
Exchange, 52-53; Dorotinsky and Pradhan, 267; Ferreira, et al., 368. 
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